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Probable Cause from Probable Bonds:
A Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA
Jessica D. Gabel*
I. INTRODUCTION
Fredo, you're nothing to me now[;] you're not a brother, you're
not a friend. I don't want to know you or what you do - I don't
want to see you at the hotels - I don't want you near my house.
When you see our mother, I want to know a day in advance, so I
won't be there. You understand?'
Imagine a routine day in your life, your usual chores, errands, and
responsibilities. A firm knock at the door disrupts the comfortable
character of this average day. Two police officers identify themselves, and
explain that they want to ask you a few routine questions in connection
with a crime. They explain that DNA recovered from a crime scene was a
lot like the DNA of one of your family members (a brother, a sister, a
parent), but not a match. Even though the two samples did not match, the
officers are certain that someone in your family committed the crime. They
want a sample of your DNA; perhaps to compare against other family
members or perhaps to match to the crime scene. What do you do? Do
you submit to having your cheek swabbed or blood drawn and send away
your genetic information in a little plastic bottle? What happens to your
DNA after the investigation? Can you say "No"? Do you have a choice?
* Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. J.D.,
University of Miami School of Law; B.S., University of Central Florida. Clerk, the
Honorable Peter T. Fay, Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. The author would like to thank Margaret "Meg" Wilkinson for her
support, advice, and solidarity. The early arrival of Meg's daughter, Daisy, provided new
insight and direction for this article. I am eternally grateful to my colleagues, Paul
Lombardo and Russell Covey, for their crucial and copious editing. Finally, credit is due to
Professor Keith Inman of Cal State East Bay whose patience with my many questions was
as invaluable as his scientific knowledge.
1. THE GODFATHER: PART II (Paramount Pictures 1974) (transcript available at
http://www.jgeoff.com/godfather/gf2/transcript/gf2transcript.html. (last visited Nov. 15,
2009).
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Would you even know if law enforcement already had a sample of your
DNA?
Maybe not. Consider the case of the BTK serial killer in Wichita,
Kansas. Self-titled "BTK" for "Bind Torture Kill," the killer kept law
enforcement at bay for thirty-one years (from 1974 to 1995).2 Ultimately,
he took the lives of ten people while he regularly sent notes that taunted the
police and media.3 BTK went "underground" after 1991, during which no
murders could be attributed to him.4 BTK resurfaced in 2004 when he sent
a letter to The Wichita Eagle, claiming responsibility for a 1986 murder.5
By virtue of other evidence, suspicion fell on Dennis Rader, a quiet
dogcatcher, husband, and father of two children.6 Needing to link Rader to
DNA collected from several of BTK's crime scenes, police went to an
unlikely source: his daughter.7 Investigators, armed with a search warrant,
8seized a tissue sample taken during a routine Pap smear. They then
compared the daughter's DNA to semen left at the first BTK crime scene in
1974.9 The familial DNA comparison confirmed that she was the daughter
of the BTK killer. 10
Dennis Rader confessed to being the BTK killer and received a
sentence of ten consecutive life terms" - there is some question about the
means. The BTK case is one of a growing number of cases involving
familial DNA searches. 12 Such cases, 13 raise legitimate concerns about the
rise of the silent informant - a conduit who may unknowingly serve as a
genetic snitch against his or her family members. This article will argue
that familial searches represent a troubling addition to the increasing
2. Brandon Ortiz, Serial Killer's Big Mistake, THE WICHITA EAGLE, Dec. 5, 2005,
http://www.kansas.com/btk/archive/story/l9184.html.
3. Id.





8. Ellen Nakashima, From DNA to Family, a Tool to Make Arrests, WASH. POST,
Apr. 21, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/04/20/AR2008042002388_pf.html. An exception in the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act allows law enforcement to obtain a student's health data with a court
order. Id.
9. See Id.; McKinley & Cosby, supra note 4; Ortiz, supra note 2.
10. Nakashima, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. Roxana Hegeman, 'BTK' Serial Killer Sentenced to 10 Consecutive Life Terms,
INDEPENDENT, Aug. 19, 2005, at 26, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/americas/btk-serial-killer-sentenced-to- 10-consecutive-life-terms-503477.html.
13. The Denver, Colorado District Attorney's Office maintains an informal database
that highlights notable cases involving familial DNA testing. The Denver District Attorney,
Mitchell R. Morrissey, pioneered (and vigorously lobbied for) the use of familial DNA da-
tabase searches in the United States to solve cold cases. See Denver District Attorney, Fa-
milial DNA Database Searches, http://www.denverda.org/DNA/FamilialDNADatabase_
Searches.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) [hereinafter "Denver Searches"].
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collection, retention, and use of genetic information. It presents the issues
related to this new level of molecular mining and presents a course of
action that attempts to balance the needs of law enforcement with potential
bioethical concerns. Before those subjects are discussed, however, it is
necessary to discuss the premise of DNA testing, the accuracy of familial
DNA testing, and to examine the role of the genetic informant.
II. FAMILY BONDING: QUESTIONS OF PEDIGREE AND
PROBABILITY
Deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") houses the complete genetic structure
of an individual and is the substance that individualizes each human
being. 14 In essence, each person's "uniqueness" starts at a microscopic
level with his or her DNA. The study of DNA has catapulted criminal
investigations into a new age - linking criminals to crime scenes using
techniques that only a few years ago were the subject of speculation and
science fiction. Today, investigators have an entire DNA arsenal to assist
in solving crimes, including mitochondrial DNA, Y-STR testing, DNA
databases, and familial DNA testing. This section examines DNA at both
the micro and macro levels, from building blocks to databases, and the
progression to familial DNA searches. Finally, the section provides an
assessment of the accuracy of familial DNA testing.
A. BRASS TACKS AND DATABASES
1. From Genes to Genomes: DNA Basics
In recent years, DNA has moved from obscurity to ubiquity. High
profile paternity and criminal cases become part of water cooler
conversation, and the "ripped from the headlines" approach of popular
television programs (such as NCIS, Criminal Minds, Forensic Files, and, of
course, the various incarnations of CSI and Law & Order) continue the soap
opera where reality left off. As a result, public acumen casts DNA in an
omnipresent role in criminal investigations. The pervasive inference being
that DNA can be recovered from almost any crime scene. While this
gratuitous conclusion may contribute to the so-called "CSI effect," 5 the
simple matter is that the public is more conscious about DNA.
14. Nat'l Comm'n on the Future of DNA Evidence, Nat'l Institute of Justice, What
Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know About DNA Evidence, Sept. 1999,
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/bc000614.pdf.
15. Since the popularity of the television program, prosecutors contend that juries
now expect to be presented with scientific evidence in even low-level misdemeanors. This
expectation is often termed the "CSI Effect." Andrew P. Thomas, The CS! Effect: Fact or
Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 70 (2006), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2006/
02/thomas.html.
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Although the general concept of DNA and its role in criminal
investigations seems familiar, the actual science and function of DNA can
be elusive and frankly dull. Nonetheless, an explanation of the
fundamentals is necessary to frame the larger picture surrounding the
incursion past our genetic boundaries. It sounds illogical that humans -
who embrace individuality - are 99.9 percent identical on a cellular
level. 1 6 With the exception of identical twins, who are 100 percent alike,
only the remaining 0.1 percent of DNA differentiates each member of the
world's population.' 7  Consequently, only that smidge of DNA is
forensically significant. 18 It is the portion of our DNA that determines our
cherished differences and individual traits such as eye color, hair color, and
height.19 While this small amount of DNA manifests these cosmetic (or
phenotypic) characteristics, it also contains our genotypic differences -
those such as blood type, allergies, or the regulation of insulin production
that do not affect outward appearance, but are nonetheless unique
variations in our genetic code.20 For example, think of our genetic code as
a recipe for chicken noodle soup. Assume that 99.9 percent of your recipe
is identical to all other chicken noodle soup recipes. The phenotypic
differences are exhibited by the addition of the noticeable ingredients -
chicken, carrots, celery, onions, and noodles. The genotypic differences -
those not visible - occur at the base level of the recipe for the soup: the
amount of salt, broth, and water. Small tweaks to the base recipe, although
unseen, will slightly alter the soup's flavor (genotype). Thus, for purposes
of this basic example, the possible variations on the combination of noodles
and vegetables, along with the molecular-level differences in the soup base,
render each person's chicken soup unique.21
DNA is the source of our uniqueness, but that concept does not shed
light on what DNA actually is, what it is made of, or how it achieves
forensic significance. The average adult body contains approximately fifty
to one hundred trillion cells.22 Those cells each house a nucleus, which is
the brain of the cell. 23 There are forty-six chromosomes within the nuclei
of cells.24 These chromosomes are comprised of DNA strands in the
classic double helix configuration that envelop a protein backbone.25 The
16. LAWRENCE F. KOBILINSKY, THOMAS F. LIoTTI & JAMEL OESER-SWEAT, DNA:
FORENSIC AND LEGAL APPLICATIONS 17 (2004).
17. NORAH RUDIN & KEITH INMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS
33 (2d ed. 2002).
18. Id.
19. RUDIN & INMAN, supra note 17.
20. Id.
21. Save for identical twins, who have the exact same soup recipe (DNA).
22. Henry T. Greely, et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to
Catch Offenders'Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 248-49 (2006).
23. Id. at 248.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 249.
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forty-six chromosomes couple together in twenty-three pairs, with one set
inherited from the mother and the other set inherited from the father.2 6 The
chromosome pairs are identified by numbers one through twenty-two; the
last pair of chromosomes, which determines a person's gender, is signified
by either XX (females) or XY (males).27 Thus, an offspring's complete
chromosomal package - the twenty-three pairs - is a recombination of
one-half of the father's chromosomes and one-half of the mother's
chromosomes. The combined result of the parents' chromosomes (and
DNA building blocks) becomes a person's unique genome, his or her
genetic wiring.
28
To better illustrate the blueprint of the individual genome, visualize it
as a clear ball and inside are the twenty-three pairs of chromosomes that
resemble a favorite childhood candy, gummy worms. The gummy worms
are constructed out of billions of "base pairs" of DNA.29 These base pairs
(made up of two of the four nucleotides found in DNA) are the "rungs" of
the DNA double helix.30  Base pairs are no more than the coupling of
nucleotides found in DNA, and like chromosomes, the pairing of
nucleotides is formulaic and specific: adenine ("A") forms a base pair with
thymine ("T"); guanine ("G") pairs with cytosine ("C"). 31 A, T, G, and C
represent a genetic alphabet of four letters, and the overall arrangement of
these letters (nucleotides) serves as an operation manual for the cells. The
specific sequencing of letters (DNA nucleotides) form words (genes) that
define everything from eye color to shoe size.
Since the word "gene" is often thrown around when discussing DNA, it
is important to make the distinction and avoid confusion. Only about two
or three percent of the genome has a specific purpose, mostly a "coding"
function that instructs cells to perform specific tasks.32 A gene is a segment
of DNA that contains both coding sequences that determine what the gene
26. Greely et al., supra note 22 at 249.
27. Id.
28. Id. Most DNA is packaged in the nuclei of cells, but mitochondria also have a
small amount of their own DNA, known as "mitochondrial DNA" or "mtDNA." Id. Al-
though not the subject of this paper, in short, mtDNA is inherited from the maternal line,
and does not change from parent to offspring (unlike nuclear DNA). M. Schwartz & J.
Vissing, Paternal Inheritance of Mitochondrial DNA, 347 N. ENGL. J. MED. 576, 576-80
(2002). Recently, forensic investigations have relied upon mtDNA to identify individuals,
particularly from older skeletal remains. Since it is not nuclear DNA that contains complete
genetic information, mtDNA cannot narrow the identification to one person Nonetheless,
when used in combination with other corroborating evidence, identity can be established.
James E. Starrs, Mitochondrial DNA Analysis of the Presumptive Remains of Jesse James,
46 J. FoRENSIC SCI. 173, 173-76 (Jan 2001).
29. Greely et al., supra note 22, at 249.
30. CYRIL T. WECHT & JOHN H. R.AGo, eds., FORENSIC SCIENCE AND LAW:
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does (e.g., trigger premature gray hair), and non-coding sequences that
determine when the gene is expressed (e.g., at age twenty).33 An allele is
yet another component of the genetic building blocks. Alleles give genes
options. Since each individual acquires two copies of each chromosome,
he or she also inherits two copies of each gene (one from the mother and
one from the father); the variants of each gene are called alleles. 34 Alleles
occupy fixed positions (called a locus for one, loci for two or more) on a
specific chromosome.35
To demonstrate gene variation - alleles - consider the phenotype of
blue eyes (the outward manifestation of the gene for eye color). Suppose
that Mom has blue eyes. Her two alleles for the eye color gene are "bb."
Since both of Mom's alleles are the same, she is considered to be
homozygous at that locus on her chromosome.36 Now suppose that the
father has brown eyes, but his two alleles are different: "Bb." Dad is
considered heterozygous at that locus. 37 The Bb genotype signifies that
Dad has one allele for brown eyes and one allele for blue eyes. In a
heterozygous situation such as Dad's, the allele for brown eyes ("B")
dominates while the allele for blue eyes ("b") is recessive. Therefore, Dad
exhibits the brown-eyed phenotype.
When it comes to Mom and Dad's offspring, the resulting eye color
depends on which two alleles the child possesses and how those two alleles
interact. The alleles inherited could take on two possible combinations: bb
(with Mom and Dad each donating the recessive allele for blue eyes) or Bb
(with Dad donating the dominant brown-eyed allele and Mom donating the
blue-eye allele). Thus, the odds are even for whether this Mom and Dad
will produce a blue or brown-eyed child. As with all genes, if both parents
possess heterozygous genotypes at a particular locus then the possible
genotypes of their offspring increase. For example, if both Mom and Dad
had genotypes Bb, their potential offspring could exhibit BB, Bb, or bb
genotypes. The phenotypes remain brown or blue for eye color.
2. Constant Repetition Carries Conviction
38
Humans have approximately 20,000 to 25,000 genes in our genome
(the complete genetic package) that serve a variety of functions. 39 Our
genes, however, "only comprise about three percent of the total human
genome. 4 ° The remainder is "basically one large black box," with no
33. Helen Pearson, What is a Gene?, 441 NATURE 398, 398-401 (2006).




38. ROBERT COLLIER, RICHES WITHIN YoUR REACH: THE LAW OF THE HIGHER
POTENTIAL 344 (1947).
39. Greely et al., supra note 22, at 249.
40. VIB (the Flanders Institute for Biotechnology), Saved by Junk DNA: Vital Role
[Vol. 2 1:1
known function.41 For the time being, scientists categorize this DNA as
"junk" DNA.a2 Thus, more often than not, the genetic alphabet spells
gobbledygook that cannot be translated into a known "language" for
cellular function. Indeed, like the leftover tiles of a Scrabble game, junk
DNA fails to spell discernible words. Instead, the letters simply occupy
space in our genetic gumbo. Given that the coding DNA influences the
expression of genes, it would seem reasonable to tap this DNA as a source
of identification. To the contrary, however, the non-coding regions of junk
DNA actually house the genetic information used to establish identity.43
Identifiable patterns of genetic code known as "short tandem repeats"
("STRs") emerge in the midst of junk DNA. Although STRs have no
known function, they are valuable for their high degree of polymorphism,
or variation from person to person. 4 STRs repeat themselves across the
genetic sequences in the same pattern of the nucleotide bases (G, T, C, or
A) a quantifiable number of times.
45
Individual STRs average a length of two to five base pairs. The most
common is a repeat of four base pairs called a tetramer, of which AATG
(adenine-adenine-thymine-guanine) is an example.46 STRs demonstrate a
wide and varied range of repetitions; hence, the polymorphic nature of
STRs.47
The repeats are the foundation for forensic DNA identification.n8 The
number of times an STR repeats itself is expressed as a value.4 9 For
instance, in the STR sequence AATGAATGAATGAATGAATG, the
"AATG" region occurs five times in this sequence. In this example,
AATG has a value of five. Different people will have different values for
AATG (due to their polymorphic nature), but there is not a unique value for
each person to the exclusion of all others.50 Much like eye color, more than
one person has blue eyes, but not all people have blue eyes. STRs,
however, have far more variance than eye color, but the number of repeats
displayed at a lone STR region is quite common. 51 Each version ofrepetition (five, fifteen, twenty repeats) is a distinct allele (the same as blue,
in the Evolution of the Human Genome, SCIENCEDAILY (May 30, 2009),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/05/090528203730.htm.
41. Id.
42. Elizabeth Pennisi, DNA Study Forces Rethink of What It Means to Be a Gene,
316 SCIENCE 1556, 1556-57 (2007).
43. Greely et al., supra note 22, at 249.
44. Id. at 250.
45. Id. at 249.
46. Id. at 250.
47. JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND
GENETICS OF STR MARKERS 17-20 (2005).
48. Alec J. Jeffreys, et. al, Hypervariable 'Minisatellite'Regions in Human DNA, 314
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brown, or green eyes), 52 and each allele will be shared by anywhere from
five to twenty percent of certain populations (usually subdivided by ethnic
origin).53
At a specified locus on the chromosome, each person possesses two
copies of the same STR sequence, one from each parent. Since there are
two versions of a given STR, there are also two alleles that determine the
number of times each copy of the STR sequence repeats itself. The number
of times the STR sequence repeats is an allele.5 4 So, for each person, two
alleles determine the how many times each copy of the STR will repeat.
Therefore, like the alleles for eye color, the individual alleles that
determine the number of STR repeats might be the same value
(homozygous) or a different one (heterozygous) at that locus.
56
To simplify, a common STR is AATG 7 Dad might contribute an
allele that results in ten (10) repeats of AATG and Mom might contribute
an allele for fourteen (14) repeats of AATG. Thus, their offspring's
genotype at that locus is 9, 10.58 The numbers are of little meaning except
as identifiers; it is commonly held that the significance of the genotype for
STRs found in non-coding regions of our DNA stops at the numeric values
of the repeats. Because STRs currently are thought to lodge junk DNA,
there is no known phenotypic expression of these allele combinations.5 9
So, a person with genotype of 9, 10 at the AATG locus is no different from
another who has a genotype of 7, 7 at the same locus.
60
3. Fine-tuned Fingerprinting
As with genes, STRs occupy a fixed point on the chromosome. 61 The
locus of a given STR on the chromosome is a known quantity and can be
used as a "marker" for comparison to the STRs of other individuals.62 As
explained previously, while the repetition of STR alleles varies from person
to person, it is not unique among all individuals. Some alleles are more
52. Greely et al., supra note 22, at 250.
53. See Eleni Levedokou et al., Allele Frequencies for Fourteen STR Loci of the Po-
werPlexTM 1.1 and 2.1 Multiplex Systems and Penta D Locus In Caucasians, African-
Americans, Hospanics, and Other Populations of the United States of America and Brazil,
46 J. FORENSIC SCIENCE, 736-61 (2001).
54. Greely et al., supra note 22, at 250.
55. Id. at 249-50.
56. Id. at 250.
57. John M. Butler, Genetics and Genomics of Core Short Tandem Repeat Loci Used
in Human Identity Testing, 51 J. FORENSIC SCi. 253, 255 (2006)
58. It might be helpful to think of alleles as "variations on a theme." RUDIN &
INMAN, supra note 17, at 34. Here, the theme is the number of repeats an STR demonstrates
at a specific locus.
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common in certain populations while others rarely occur,6 3 but analyzing
the various alleles of one STR is not enough to give any definition to
identity. On the other hand, scrutinizing multiple alleles of multiple STRs
(using a standard array of STRs) enhances the discriminating powers of
DNA identification. 64 Logically, an analysis of multiple loci increases the
likelihood that the profile can be narrowed to a single individual.65
In the United States, the vast majority of crime laboratories use thirteen
STR markers, referred to as the "CODIS markers. 66 CODIS derives its
name from the FBI's Combined DNA Index System. 67  The thirteen
CODIS markers are "autosomal" loci located on twelve of the twenty-two
chromosomes that are identical in both sexes.68 Thus, the thirteen CODIS
markers remain constant for both men and women.69 Since there are two
copies of each chromosome, every individual has two copies of the thirteen
STRs, meaning that there are twenty-six points of comparison.7 °
The process of collecting and analyzing a DNA profile is often referred
to as DNA "typing," "fingerprinting," or "profiling. ' ' 71 It is not, however, a
profile of a person's full genome; the forensic use of DNA boils down to a
small snapshot of an individual's genetic structure.72 When DNA is
forensically typed, a computer-generated graph displays a series of peaks
that spike quickly like steep mountains. 73  These peaks correspond to
alleles, which the computer then labels based on their length, determined
by the number of repeats.74  So, for a complete analysis of the thirteen
CODIS markers, there will be either two peaks (heterozygous) or one peak
(homozygous) at each locus that reflect the allele from the mother and the
63. Greely, et al., supra, note 22, at 250.
64. Id.
65. Butler, supra note 57, at 253.
66. Id.
67. Id. (CODIS is further discussed in § II.A.4, infra.)
68. Id. (A "fourteenth" CODIS marker is also analyzed on the twenty-third chromo-
some in order to determine the gender of the DNA source. Butler, supra note 57, at 253.
Since this marker only distinguishes gender, the thirteen CODIS markers are the "core loci"
of DNA identification.) Id.
69. Butler, supra note 57, at 253.
70. Id.
71. See Id. (A whole genomic profile entails decoding the entire spectrum of DNA
in the body, including mitochondrial DNA. The FBI articulates this process as similar to
running fingerprints through the Automated Fingerprint Identification System ("AFIS"),
although as discussed, infra, that analogy is misplaced.)
72. A genome profile will reveal diagnostic information, including medical history
and disease informationote. The magnitude of the data is tremendous, since there are rough-
ly six billion base pairs in a human genome. NECIA GRANT COOPER, THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT: DECIPHERING THE BLUEPRINT OF HEREDITY 316-18 (1994). On the other hand, a
DNA profile mainly focuses on the likelihood that the biological sample came from a spe-
cific person, and (purportedly) reveals only innocuous information about STR alleles.
73. RUDIN & INMAN, supra note 17, at 97-139.
74. Butler, supra note 57, at 23-25.
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allele from the father. 75 Thus, under the CODIS system, a person's "DNA
fingerprint" consists of the twenty-six allele values that correspond to the
number of repeats exhibited by that individual at the thirteen CODIS
markers.76
4. The Next Stage in Banking
77
By probing thirteen loci (the United Kingdom uses ten), the CODIS
system aims to be an effective tool in exacting the identity of an individual
to the exclusion of all others.78 DNA is like a shiny new brand of criminal
investigation tools, which make fingerprints and mugshots seem slightly
outdated. James Watson and Frederick Crick cracked the mystery of the
double helix in 1953 and removed it from obscurity.79 By 1984, British
geneticist Alec Jeffreys pioneered the use of DNA fingerprinting in
immigration, criminal, and paternity cases. 80 In 1987, DNA left by the
perpetrator solved a rape case in Orlando, Florida, making it the first
conviction in the nation won, in part, by using DNA evidence.
81
As the science of DNA developed, law enforcement officials quickly
saw its potential to provide hard science for solving cases and increasing
the conviction rate).82 DNA evidence would save time, narrow the
suspects, and ultimately solve more cases.83 The use of DNA evidence in
criminal cases expanded at breakneck speed. Not only could it identify the
guilty, but it could also exonerate the innocent.84 By the mid- 1990s, DNA
evidence was well on its way to becoming a "critical component" of
criminal justice system.85  The O.J. Simpson trial in 1995 brought the
significance of DNA into the mainstream.
86
The proliferation of biological evidence collected in criminal cases
directly correlates to the advancements in DNA technology.87 As scientists
were able to extract testable DNA samples from smaller and varied
specimens, evidence rooms were bombarded with unprecedented amounts
75. Greely et al., supra note 22, at 250.
76. Butler, supra note 57, at 23-25.
77. Wells Fargo slogan, http://www.textart.ru/database/slogan/3-bank-advertising-
slogans.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2009).
78. RON C. MICHAELIS, ET AL., A LITIGATIOR'S GUIDE TO DNA 105 (Elseiver 2008).
79. James Watson & Frederick Crick F.H.C., A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic
Acid, 171 NATURE 737-38 (1953).
80. U.S. News & World Report, DNA's Twists of History, U.S. News & World Re-
port, Feb. 16, 2003, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/030224/24dna.b.htm.
81. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 842-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th 1988), review
denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989).
82. MICHAELIS, ET AL., supra note 78, at xiii.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 369.
85. Id. at xiii.
86. See William C. Thompson, DNA Evidence in the O.J. Simpson Trial, 67 U.
COLO. L. REv. 827 (1996).
87. WECHT & RAGO, supra note 30, at 421-22.
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of biological material. As DNA harvesting went beyond the bounds of
blood, evidence took the form of semen, saliva, hair, tissue, bones, teeth,
and sweat found on or in clothes, soda cans, hairbrushes, toothbrushes,
stamps, envelopes, Kleenex, chewing gum, cigarette butts - anything a
person would come in contact with.88 The places where DNA could be
found became a smorgasbord of opportunity, and DNA was well on its way
to becoming the "gold standard" of forensic analysis.89 Indeed, by 1995,
challenges to DNA as evidence of identity lost their steam. 90
With the amount of DNA evidence being used in criminal cases,
governments saw a practical reality: the need to house, maintain, and recall
the DNA profiles of offenders for use in solving other crimes. The United
Kingdom ("UK") led the charge with its "aggressive approach" to DNA
profiling, and created the most comprehensive DNA database in the
world.91
To tackle the issue, state and federal agencies began to log DNA
profiles into large computer databases - DNA databases. 92 In 1990, the
FBI created the Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS"), from which the
CODIS STR markers derive their name. 93  CODIS was designed to
coordinate the various national, state, and local DNA databases in a
centralized system, and "foster the exchange and comparison of forensic
DNA evidence from violent crime investigations."9 4 In 1994, the DNA
Identification Act ("DNA Act") authorized the FBI to create the National
DNA Index System ("NDIS").95
88. WECHT & RAGO, supra note 30, at 421-22.
89. Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Re-
gulate Crime Labs, 86 NOTEC. L. REv. 163, 171 (2007) (noting DNA profiling as "the cur-
rent gold standard in forensic science").
90. WECHT & RAGO, supra note 30, at 428 (citing People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
91. Kenworthy Bilz, Self-Incrimination Doctrine Is Dead; Long Live Self-
Incrimination Doctrine: Confessions, Scientific Evidence, and the Anxieties of the Liberal
State, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 807, 819 (2008).
92. DNA Initiative: Advancing Criminal Justice Through DNA Technology, Com-
bined DNA Index System, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/codis (last visited on Nov. 15,
2009). (The terms "data bank" and "database" are often used interchangeably, which is
technically incorrect. Under scientific convention, "database" refers to a "digitized set of
profiles," and "data bank" is the repository that encompasses "both physical samples and
profiles." David Lazer and Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, Statutory Frameworks for Regulat-
ing Information Flows: Drawing Lessons for the DNA Data Banks from Other Government
Data Systems, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHics 366, 371 n. 56 (2006). Thus, the physical samples
(i.e., the DNA from the saliva swab) reside in the data bank, while the data generated from
that sample - the genetic CODIS profile - is uploaded into a database and can later be
searched.) Id.
93. Id.
94. Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/html/
codisl.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2009).
95. Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS Brochure, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/
pdf/codisbrochure2.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) [hereinafter "CODIS Brochure"].
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In addition to warehousing the National DNA database, NDIS is linked
into CODIS-affiliated labs at the local and state level. NDIS stockpiles
DNA profile records entered by local, state and federal enforcement
agencies. 96  CODIS supports NDIS as an "automated DNA information
processing and telecommunication system.,
97
An array of DNA profiles is entered into CODIS from laboratories at
the local, state, and national levels. 98 This three-tier structure functions as a
food chain, where information at the lowest level is fed into larger mouths
(databases). It begins at the local level ("LDIS" - Local DNA Index
System) where local laboratories take samples from both crime scenes and
offenders and generate them into CODIS profiles.99 At the second level
("SDIS" - State DNA Index System), state law enforcement agencies
input this information into their statewide databases.100 At the top of the
database food chain - the national level - state profiles are uploaded into
NDIS. 101 NDIS will reject samples that do not have results at ten or more
of the CODIS core loci.1
0 2
In terms of criminal investigations, CODIS draws from two indices:
DNA profiles of individuals (mostly convicted offenders) and the other
containing unidentified DNA from crime scenes. 10 3 As it pertains to federal
offenders, the DNA Act, and its later amendments, requires collection of
DNA samples from those convicted of, among other things, any felony or
crime of violence, certain sexual offenses, and conspiracy to commit those
crimes. 10 4  The majority of DNA profiles stored in NDIS are those of
convicted felons who have served time for crimes such as assault and
battery, rape, murder, and robbery, but the DNA Act now provides for
DNA collection from individuals on probation, parole, and supervised
96. DNA Initiative: Advancing Criminal Justice Through DNA Technology, DNA
Databases: Levels of the Database, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/levels (last visited
Nov. 15, 2009) [hereinafter "DNA Initiative"].
97. DNA Initiative, supra note 96.
98. Id.
99. Id. All profiles originate at the local level, and then flow into the state and na-
tional databases. See CODIS Brochure, supra note 94.
100. Id. Laboratories within states can exchange information through SDIS. See
CODIS Brochure, supra, note 94.
101. Id. NDIS enables laboratories to exchange and compare information on a na-
tional scale. See CODIS Brochure, supra note 95.
102. (DNA Initiative: Advancing Criminal Justice Through DNA Technology, DNA
Databases: NDIS Procedures and Administration, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/ndis/.)
(States are responsible for establishing individual policies, generally through legislation,
regarding which samples may be added to the state DNA database. States have the ability to
set procedures for data entry and search parameters on CODIS within that state. At the na-
tional level, however, states should have a degree of uniformity about the use of CODIS.)
103. Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming "Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and
Genetic Privacy, 100 N.W. U. L. REv. 857, 876 (2006). CODIS does include other indices:
the Arrestee Index, the Missing or Unidentified Persons Index, and the Missing Persons
Reference Index. See CODIS Brochure, supra note 95.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d)(l)-(4).
[Vol. 2 1:1
release for federal offenses. 10 5 Nevertheless, the genetic profiles of those
convicted did not satisfy the NDIS appetite, so the DNA Fingerprint Act of
2005 now allows the DNA samples of federal arrestees to be maintained in
NDIS.1
0 6
In addition to the federal provisions regarding the collection and
maintenance of DNA samples from offenders (and alleged offenders), all
fifty states now have similar provisions that mandate DNA databases,
although states are at liberty to designate the types of crimes that require
DNA samples and whether or not arrestees will be included.10 7 Nearly one-
third of the states allow for the inclusion of arrestees' DNA profiles. 0 8
Moreover, individual profiles remain in CODIS indefinitely - unless that
individual petitions either the federal or state government for expungement
of the profile. 10 9 Of course, the individual must produce "a certified copy
of a final court order establishing that such charge has been dismissed, has
resulted in an acquittal, or that no charge was filed within the applicable
time period."' 1 0 There is no similar expunction scheme for profiles in the
forensic index since those are unknown profiles in unsolved cases.
5. Database, Database Make Me A Match
Having covered the stratification of DNA databases, several points
should be made about the mechanics of the "match" process. As explained
above, profiles of biological evidence recovered from a crime scene are
stored in the forensic index and individuals' DNA profiles are kept in the
offender index. Profiles in the forensic index may be from recent cases or
"cold" cases, which have languished on, unsolved for years, but for which
biological evidence remains intact and profiled."' The profiles from the
forensic index are run in CODIS against the offender index to find a
potential match between the unidentified crime scene sample and a specific
offender." 12
For any given search, there is a lot to choose from. The NDIS contains
over 7,137,468 offender profiles and 272,452 forensic profiles as of June
105. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2) (2000).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2005).
107. Lazer and Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra, note 92, at 371.
108. Eileen Sullivan, Feds To Collect DNA from Every Person They Arrest, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 16, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/n/a/2008/04/ 16/
national/w135304D42.DTL (describing plans of federal government to expand database to
include arrestees' profiles and noting that at least thirteen states have similar provisions, in-
cluding: Alaska, Arizona, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mex-
ico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia).
109. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Expungement of DNA Records in Accordance
with 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A), http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/html/expungement.htm (last
visited Aug. 7, 2009).
110. Id.
111. Butler, supra note 47, at 1-13.
112. Id.
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2009.113 According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the success and
utility of the CODIS program "will be measured by the crimes it helps to
solve."' 14 CODIS tracks its progress by using the "Investigation Aided"
metric, which tallies the number of criminal investigations where CODIS
has "added value" to some aspect of the case.' 15 According to September
2009 statistics, the CODIS program has produced over 98,700 hits assisting
in more than 97,000 investigations." 
6
A "hit" occurs when an offender profile matches a crime scene sample
at all thirteen CODIS markers." 7 A "cold hit" occurs when an offender
profile is linked to a cold case years after the crime was committed." 8 If
there is a match to an offender, the police consider that person a likely
suspect, and the hit typically serves as probable cause for law enforcement
to obtain an additional DNA sample from the person identified by the
database search." 9
The premise of the "hit" seems clear-cut since a computer is doing the
heavy lifting, but a complex collection of issues present themselves once
the search is underway. First, a computer does not announce a match.
20
Rather, the computer presents a DNA analyst with a "reasonable number"
of possible matches to examine further. 121 In the best-case scenario, when
all alleles at all loci correspond between the forensic profile and the
offender profile, the analyst can declare a match. 122  Often, however,
profiles collected from crime scenes and uploaded into the forensic index
113. Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS-NDIS Statistics, http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) [herinafter "FBI"].
114. FBI, supra note 113.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. BUTLER, supra note 47, at 446.
118. GEORGE CLARK, JUSTICE AND SCIENCE: TRIALS AND TRIUMPHS OF DNA
EVIDENCE 179-86 (2007).
119. RICHARD H. WALTON, COLD CASE HOMICIDES: PRACTICAL INVESTIGATIVE
TECHNIQUES 352, 355 (2006).
120. INMAN & RUDrN, supra note 17, at 168.
121. Id. The science of DNA is sound, but, as other scholars' articles rightly point
out, errors can be made by analysts who evaluate the results of DNA tests. See Tania
Simoncelli and Barry Steinhardt, California's Proposition 69: A Dangerous Precedent for
Criminal DNA Databases, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 199 (2006) (noting the errors associated
with DNA analysis since "significant ambiguity can arise in interpreting the computer-
generated graph displays that are produced in DNA testing." A particular problem is the
interpretation of results when there is a mixture of two or more sources of DNA. As
Simoncelli and Steinhardt point out, these causes make it "difficult to determine which
alleles go with which contributor." Those points are valid and real, but beyond the scope of
this paper. This section focuses on the objective components of DNA testing, but the reader
should neither ignore nor discount the fact that not all DNA is science and in some instances
the art (of interpretation) can obscure the science. See also Erin Murphy, The New
Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific
Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 754-57 (2007) (enumerating the multitude of scandals that
have plagued forensic DNA analysis).).
122. INMAN & RUD[N, supra note 17, at 168.
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are incomplete due to degradation or small sample size.' 23  Recall that
CODIS requires the presence of alleles at only ten STR markers for a valid
forensic sample, making a match at all CODIS markers impossible.
1 24
Indeed, when alleles are not visible at all loci, an analyst cannot make an
accurate match, and this presents a problem in terms of identification.
1 25
To compensate for this difficulty, the CODIS program allows the analyst
"flexibility" when choosing "specific match criteria for the computer to
follow during a search."
' 126
Flexibility means choices, and an analyst can adjust a search from four
different match criteria: (a) stringency; (b) minimum number of loci
required for a match; (c) loci exclusion; and (d) indexes to search. 127 This
article focuses mainly on adjustments to the stringency of search. In a high
stringency search - the most discriminating of search parameters - the
number of alleles and allelic values must be identical. In other words, the
crime scene sample and the offender sample must have the same amount
and value of alleles at all loci.128 In that instance, the match is made, and
the offender is the likely source of the DNA sample at the crime scene,
with likeliness expressed as a statistic, discussed infra.1 29 By contrast, a
low stringency search is one where both the crime scene and offender
samples have at least one allele in common (one out of twenty-six possible
commonalities).130  In the middle of the mix is a moderate stringency
search, which is a hybrid of the two. Some, but not all of the alleles needed
to match, different labs may set their own benchmark of what amounts to a
"moderate" stringency search.131
Consequently, as the stringency of a search decreases, the further the
search moves away from finding a true match. Instead, the search morphs
into one for a "partial" match.1 32 A partial match can occur in one of two
ways. The first, often called database "trawling," involves running a
degraded crime scene sample 33 against the offender index (or a subset




127. Id. at 168-70.
128. INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 17, at 168.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 169.
131. Id. at 168.
132. Maran Sjerps & Ate D. Kloosterman, On the Consequences of DNA Profile
Mismatches for Close Relatives of an Excluded Suspect, 112 INT'L J. LEGAL MED. 176, 176-
78 (1999).
133. Environmental factors such as water, heat, and enzymes, eat away at DNA.
Over time DNA deteriorates, leaving less viable genetic material in a biological sample
available for future testing; ultimately hampering efforts to produce a complete profile.
When such samples are subjected to STR analysis, it can result in an incomplete profile -
where some alleles fail report any value. Butler, supra note 57, at 145-46.
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thereof) for the chance of a "cold hit."'134 In the case of a cold hit, the
partial match arises because the complete offender profile is identified as
the possible source of the DNA in the incomplete forensic profile."3 5 In
that case, the missing alleles from the forensic sample may well belong to
the
offender, and law enforcement will seek a fresh sample from that person.
136
Hopefully, investigators will also search for other corroborating evidence
beyond the partial match, but that is not always the case. 1
37
A second method for finding a partial match, and the subject of this
article, also involves trawling, albeit trawling for innocents. In this
scenario, a complete forensic sample runs against the offender index for a
hit that has some but not all the alleles in common. Since two samples
have less than the perfect thirteen CODIS markers in common, and only
"partially match" at some loci. A partial match here means that the
offender 138 is not the source of the crime scene DNA sample since it is
clear that some alleles do not match. Not a suspect, this person instead
becomes a "pivot.' ' 139 As a pivot, this individual functions as a genetic
beacon who may point the way to the actual source, someone who shares a
similar profile with the pivot - a family member. 140 This familial match is
based on the genetic maxim that related persons have far more
commonalities in their genetic profiles than do random unrelated
persons.141
The main difference between these two techniques is in the approach:
the cold hit partial match represents an inadvertent hit from a routine search
of a database. 142  Conversely, the familial match is made by way of
deliberately trolling the database for close biological relatives after the first
search fails to produce a perfect match. 143 In the cold case, the assumption
is that the "hit" is the source of the crime scene evidence. In the familial
case, the hit is presumed related to the source.
134. David H. Kaye, Rounding up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis
of DNA Trawling Cases, 87 NOTEC. L. REv. 425, 427 (2009).
135. Kaye, supra note 134, at 427.
136. Id.
137. Id. (describing the case of John Davis in San Francisco, who was arrested for
the murder of his neighbor twenty-two years later. The jury had only the database match as
evidence of guilt).
138. Even though a sample is from the offender index, that individual may or may
not be incarcerated. Absent expungement, all samples remain in the database and are in-
cluded in searches regardless of release from the correctional system.
139. Erica Haimes, Social and Ethical Issues in the Use of Familial Searching in Fo-




142. Jeffrey Rosen, Genetic Surveillance for All, SLATE, Mar. 17, 2009,
http://www.slate.com/id/2213958/pagenum/all/.
143. Id.
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Thus, in a cold case, the offender's DNA pieces might still fit into the
crime scene puzzle. In the familial search, however, the offender has some
DNA pieces that will never fit into the crime scene puzzle. The familial
search onto the first search after it yields no perfect matches. 44 The more
customized familial search then scans the database proactively for possible
relatives. 145 Using complicated algorithms, the CODIS software measures
the probability of the source (from the forensic index) being related to the
pivot (from the offender index).
146
On the surface, the premise seems well intentioned since the obvious
goal is to solve a crime. Underneath, however, is a proving ground of
potential constitutional and ethical issues. Investigators will seek DNA
samples from close relatives of the pivot. Indeed, this type of search -
familial search - squarely plops the government in the thick of family
bonds. Sections III and IV, infra, explore the repercussions often ignored
in the haste to adopt new technology.
B. THE FAMILY DYNAMIC
First employed in the UK, the familial DNA search evolved from the
basic principle that related persons share a similar, but not identical, genetic
profile. 147  The value in using familial DNA testing in criminal
investigations is uncomplicated. Families spring from the same gene pool
and share genetic similarities; common alleles give rise to traits shared
within a
family - appearance, medical history, and disease vulnerability. 148  As
discussed, infra, the assumptions associated with familial searching (i.e., a
critical mass of common alleles from which relatedness could be inferred)
may produce a hidden justification (and broader social implication) that
assumes criminal behavior is a trait particular to a family.
149
As explained in section II.A.3, supra, the twenty-six alleles of the
CODIS markers are directly inherited from one's parents; thirteen from
each parent. The profiles of a biological parent and child will have at least
thirteen alleles (one at each locus) in common. 50 There may be more if the
144. Maura Dolan & Jason Felch, California Takes Lead on DNA Crime Fighting
Technique, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 2008.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Frederick R. Bieber, et al., Finding Criminals Through DNA of Their Relatives,
312 SCIENCE 1315 (June 2006).
148. Studies comparing genetic profiles between parent and child or between sibl-
ings estimate that full siblings share an average of four of the thirteen CODIS markers,
compared to an average of less than a single locus among unrelated individuals. Kimberly
A. Wah, A New Investigative Lead: Familial Searching as an Effective Crime-Fighting
Tool, 29 WHITTIER L. REv. 909, 947 (2008).
149. Robin Williams and Paul Johnson, Inclusiveness, Effectiveness, and Intrusive-
ness: Issues in the Developing Uses of DNA Profiling in Support of Criminal Investigations,
33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 545, 555 (2005).
150. Greely, et al., supra note 22, at 252-53.
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biological parents randomly have the same allelic values. 151  Siblings,
however, are not uniform in the alleles they inherit from their parents (if
they were they would be identical twins). A biological parent and child
must share at least one allele at each CODIS locus, but siblings may share
one, two, or no alleles at a given locus due to the random nature of
inheritance 5 2 (as with example in section II.A.1, infra, the brown-eyed
father and the blue-eyed mother may have offspring with either brown or
blue eyes). At least one study estimates that siblings share an average of
16.7 of the twenty-six CODIS alleles.153 Random strangers may only share
seven or eight alleles, depending on the rarity of the allele.
54
Of course, much of the success of familial DNA searches depends upon
the direct genetic relationship - biological parents and children and full
siblings. 155 Relationships matter, but familial DNA searches lose their
effectiveness (and justification) as the genetic ties weaken.' 56 Nonetheless,
profiling the relative of the suspect, from a purely objective standpoint,
could provide valuable information to an investigation.
As between parents and children, profiling both parents reveals all the
possible alleles (fifty-two in all) that a suspect might possess in a CODIS
profile. Thus, that person can be excluded as a suspect or remain a possible
source of the crime scene evidence. The reverse analysis - looking to the
child's DNA for clues about the parent-suspect's DNA - is also possible,
as in the BTK case. 157 The results are less concrete, however, when only a
partial profile of the parent could be ascertained from the child since a
parent contributes just half of the child's alleles. Clearly, this limitation did
not impede the BTK investigation.
Except for the more unusual case like BTK, familial DNA searches and
tests generally aim to ferret out a pivot's sibling who might be the source of
DNA left at a crime scene. When cases are solved by virtue of familial
DNA searches, the stories dominate the news. Take the case of one sticky
brick. 58 In March 2003, someone threw a brick off a bridge in the middle
of the night. 59  On the highway below, the brick blew through the
windshield of a truck, killing the driver. 60 DNA found on the brick (not
belonging to the victim) was then run through the UK national database,
but failed to yield a match at all 10 loci used by the British.'16 Authorities
151. Greely, et al., supra note 22, at 253.
152. Greely, et al., supra note 22, at 252-53.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Williams and Johnson, supra note 149, at 554.
156. Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in Law
Enforcement: What Role for Privacy?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 153, 156 (2006).
157. Nakashima, supra note 8.
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then instituted a DNA dragnet, seeking voluntary samples from young men
in the area. This again produced no results.
162
As a last resort, the Forensic Science Services ("FSS") conducted a low
stringency search of the national database. 63 FSS limited the search to
white males (based on ethnic markers typed in the unknown's profile),
under the age of thirty-five, living in the areas of Surrey and Hampshire,
southeast of London. 16 The familial search produced a list of twenty-five
names with profiles that matched at least eleven of the twenty alleles used
in the UK system. 65  The twenty-five profiles were prioritized by the
amount of alleles in common. At the top of the list was a profile that
matched the brick profile at sixteen loci. 66 An interview of the individual
at the top of list revealed that he had a brother who was twenty years old
who lived near the area where the crime was committed.167 The brother -
Craig Harmon - confessed to the crime and was sentenced to six years in
prison.
168
As evidenced by the sticky brick case, and others like it, the United
Kingdom routinely uses familial searching when a full profile search yields
no results. 169 By FSS numbers, the UK has performed seventy familial
searches since 2004, resulting in eighteen matches and thirteen
convictions. 70  Mitch Morrissey, the Denver District Attorney,
spearheaded the use of familial searching in the United States after visiting
the UK. 17 1 Morrissey asked the FBI to relax its policy against familial
DNA testing. 172 The FBI did not - and as of this writing - has not
wavered on its own position against familial DNA searches.1
73
Nonetheless, the FBI instituted an interim plan for the release of
information related to familial searches. 174 Under this plan, the FBI defines
a partial match as a moderate stringency search that results in two single-
source profiles (as opposed to mixed samples with multiple contributors)
162. Rosen, supra note 142.
163. Forensic Science Service, Craig Harman - Family DNA link offers crime
breakthrough, http://www.forensic.gov.uk/html/media/case-studies/f-39.html (last visited
Aug. 6, 2009).
164. Id.




169. Forensic Science Service, (Fact Sheet (4): Familial Searching), Feb. 2005,
http://www.forensic.gov.uk/pdf/company/foi/publicationscheme/communications/
Familialsearching.pdf.




174. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Interim Plan for the Release of Information in
the Event of a "Partial Match" at NDIS, Jul. 20, 2006, http://www.bioforensics.com/
conference08/FamilialSearches/CODISBulletinotepdf [hereinafter "Partial Match Re-
lease"].
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having at least one allele in common at each lOCUS. 175  When a match
occurs at the national search level, NDIS procedures prohibit the release of
that individual's identity. 76  Individual states, however, can make their
own decisions on whether they will conduct familial searches in their own
databases. 177  At opposite ends of the spectrum are California and
Maryland. 1
78
In April 2008, the California Department of Justice relaxed its policies
to allow for familial DNA searches and the reporting of results to
authorities for further investigation. 179 The policy shift makes California
the national leader in familial DNA searching.' 80  Unlike other states,
California vigorously pursues familial searching as a matter of policy rather
than happenstance. 18' California's policy requires a sharing of at least
fifteen alleles, additional DNA testing, and a prosecution committee review
before the pivot's name will be released to authorities. But the policy lacks
any similar safeguards for the relatives of the pivot who may be implicated
by the results of a familial search. 182 California Attorney General Jerry
Brown stated that the new policy was warranted because of the rise in
violent crime in the state.' 
83
In contrast to California, Maryland takes the opposite approach. In
2008, Maryland enacted a law to expand its DNA database to include
mandatory samples from anyone charged with a crime of violence.
84
Despite this expansion, the law also clearly prohibits a familial trawl of the
database to hunt out possible relatives of the source of a DNA sample.
185
Polar opposites, California and Maryland respectively represent the
aggressive and guarded approaches to familial DNA searching.
C. ACCURATE ANCESTRY
If Maryland and the FBI refuse to actively conduct such searches, it
prompts one to ask "why?" An initial question might be whether familial
DNA search is a reliable method of identifying possible suspects.
175. Partial Match Release, supra note 174.
176. Rosen, supra note 142.
177. Id.
178. Molly McDonough, Familial DNA Searches are Creating Genetic Informants,
ABA JOURNAL, Apr. 21, 1998, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/familial dna-searches_
are creating-geneticinformants/.
179. Memorandum from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Att'y Gen. of Cal. to All Cal. Law
Enforcement Agencies and Dist. Att'ys Offices, DNA Partial Match (Crime Scene DNA
Profile to Offender) Policy (Apr. 25, 2008) [hereinafter "Partial Match Memorandum"].




184. Maryland State Police, News Release: Governor Signs Legislation to Expand
DNA Database And Strengthen Public Safety in Maryland, May 13, 2008,
http://www.mdsp.org/Media/press-release-details.asp?identifier-618.
185. Id.
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Unreliability in this context means that the scientific process underlying
familial DNA profiling is somehow dubious. With DNA testing, however,
reliability is the wrong question. It is a question of accuracy, as described
below. The statistical technicalities and intricacies at play in familial DNA
are beyond the scope of this article, but a short summary (minus the
laborious mathematical formulas) is necessary.
Assume there are two brothers, "John" and "Joe," who are not identical
twins. If you take a blood sample from each brother and run DNA tests,
the same two different but perhaps similar profiles emerge. Much like
blood types, an individual's genetic profile should yield the same result
each time (absent lab or analyst errors). Genetic profiles do not deviate; if
an analyst runs a sample one hundred times, the test should net the same
genetic profile one hundred times. That demonstrates reliability.18 6 Here,
the better question about John and Joe's relationship should be couched in
terms of accuracy. 87 Accuracy evaluates whether or not the right result
can be reached and what the strength of that result is. 1 88 In our example,
the result sought is how strong the likelihood is that John and Joe are
related. 189
In the context of a database case, some jurisdictions, such as California,
follow the prescription that the identity of the offender will not be released
to authorities without a showing of the likelihood of kinship between the
offender sample and forensic sample.1 90 For example, a crime scene
sample is run through the database at a moderate stringency (where the two
samples must have at least fifteen common alleles) against the offender
index. Several profiles meet the stringency criteria, and the top profile
shows that the offender sample (the pivot) and the forensic sample (the
source) have twenty out of twenty-six alleles in common. Additionally, the
pivot and source share a Y chromosome, meaning that they are two males.
For the sake of simplicity, assume that there is one locus where no alleles
match, meaning that the pivot and source cannot be father and son. The
logical conclusion is that the two are brothers. Authorities are eager to
look at the pivot's family members, including any brothers, but the strength
of the evidence must be quantified.
In this case, the hypothesis is that the pivot and source are related (H 1).
In order to evaluate the strength of this hypothesis, it must be compared to
the alternative hypothesis, which is that the pivot and source are not related
(H2). 19 1 The alternative hypothesis is necessary to determine the
significance of the match. 92 To quantify the comparison between HI and




190. Partial Match Memorandum, supra note 179.
191. INMAN & RuDtN, supra note 17, at 139-48.
192. People v. Wilson, 38 Cal. 4th 1237, 1247-48 (2006).
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H2, both hypotheses (related vs. unrelated) are measured in terms of
probabilities, or the chances of that event being true.193  Note that this
inquiry differs slightly from the traditional statistical model for DNA
evidence that compares the chance that a suspect is the source of the
biological evidence to the chance that the suspect is not the source.
194
There are various methods that can be used to assess the strength of the
DNA evidence.1 95 Some statistical models lead to the mind-numbing "one
in one trillion" articulations about the chance that the DNA belongs to
someone other than the defendant. 196 Arguments over the various statistical
approaches and the problem of jurors equating such numbers with guilt
rather than the true hypothesis (that the defendant is the source of the
biological sample) are not the subject of this article, and are better
discussed by the National Research Council in two related reports, NRC I
and NRC 11.197 For familial searches - where the initial inquiry is kinship
rather than the determination of whether a defendant is the source of a
crime scene
sample - this article advocates for the use of the likelihood ratio (the
"LR"). The LR is widely used in the UK for familial searches, but is
generally limited to paternity cases in the United States.
1 98
193. INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 17, at 139-48.
194. INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 17, at 139-48.
195. United States v. Williams, 2008 WL 5382264 *17-18 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (ex-
plaining the competing theories of DNA statistics).
196. Jonathan Koehler, On Conveying The Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Fre-
quencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 859, 860 (1996).
197. In 1992, the National Research Council ("NRC"), a branch of the National
Academy of Sciences, published a comprehensive report on probability calculations related
to forensic DNA profiling. National Research Council, DNA Technology in Forensic
Science 74 (1992) [hereinafter "NRC I"]. NRC I addressed the "substantial controversy"
associated with the proper methodology the statistical rubric used to measure a DNA
"match." NRC I questioned the use of the "product rule" used to calculate the frequency of
alleles and genetic profiles. For example, if the frequency of an allele is 10 percent of a
given population, then among those population members one in ten will carry that allele.
The product rule takes all of the allele frequencies in a profile (thirteen) and multiplies them
together to arrive at the frequency of that specific genetic profile (often expressed in terms
of one in several million or sometimes billion). In the wake of NRC I, courts questioned the
admission of DNA frequency statistics that were based upon application of the product rule.
This reluctance caused the NRC to revisit population genetics and the product rule in 1996.
See Generally National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence 97
(1996) [hereinafter "NRC II"]. NRC II noted improvements in DNA technology and
developments in the study of population subgroups in the intervening years between NRC I
and NRC II. Id. 57-80. Ultimately, NRC II endorsed the use of racial population databases
to generate DNA probabilities across various ethnic and racial groups. Id.
198. Michaelis, supra note 78, at 135. In kinship studies, computer simulations
indicate a correlation between individuals by using LRs. A higher LR translates to a greater
the likelihood of relatedness between two individuals. Moreover, these simulations
demonstrated that when a biological child's DNA profile is run against an index of 50,000
offenders, the parent-offender would have the highest LR fifty percent of the time and a
ninety-nine percent chance of appearing in the top 100 possibilities (ranked by LR).
Siblings showed a similar concordance. See Wah supra note 148.
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The LR compares the two hypotheses and expresses them as a ratio. 99
That is, to arrive at the LR, you must answer the question of how much
more likely is it that the pivot and source are related (HI) than not (H2)?
200
The LR can then be articulated as "it is x times more likely that the pivot
and source are brothers than that they are unrelated., 20 1 To put numbers to
words, the probability of HI (being related) is generally deemed one;
statistical models initially assume that the two samples came from two
related persons. 0 2 The probability of H2 (that these samples are from two
random unrelated persons) is a more difficult number to calculate. For this
example, assume that H2 is 1/100,000. Thus, the LR = 1/(1/100,000). LR
= 100,000, meaning that it is 100,000 times more likely that the two are
203related than it is that they are not.
Of course, this would be an easy calculation were it not for the fact that
there is wide disagreement over how to calculate H2 - the probability that
204 Thtwo unrelated person will share so many alleles in common. °  The
probabilities at issue with DNA typing are based on population genetics. 205
What seems like a simple matter of calculating a few percentages actually
spawned the most controversy in the broader application of DNA
evidence.206 The controversy stems from several sources, not including the
debate about which mathematical formula to use.20 7
From the use of ethnic population figures that most closely associate
with the known ethnicity of the defendant to including racial and ethnic
considerations to the allele frequencies, the path to a probability is littered
with plenty of obstacles.20 8 For instance, the probability of the source and
pivot being brothers should take the rarity of alleles into consideration.20 9
Just like the prevalence of brown eyes compared to that of blue eyes, some
STR alleles are more common in the population than others. So if the
source and pivot share alleles on the rarer side,210 the probability that they
199. INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 17, at 148.
200. INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 17, at 148.
201. Id. at 149.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Greely, et al., supra note 22, at 253; See Generally Michaelis, supra note 78.
205. Michaelis, supra note 78, at 135.
206. Id. at 91.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 113-18.
209. Id.
210. For example, according to the FBI's population statistics for the CODIS STR
markers, the STR known as "D3S 1358" has at least twelve different alleles. The allele that
expresses twelve repeats of that STR is found in only 0.24 percent of the African-American
populationote On the other hand, the allele that expresses fifteen repeats of the same STR is
found in twenty-nine percent of the African-American population. Consequently, a DNA
profile that repeats that STR fifteen times is more common (at least for that STR locus) than
a profile that repeats the STR twelve times. Bruce Budowle, Brendan Shea, Stephen Niez-
goda, Ranajit Chakraborty, CODIS STR Loci Data from 41 Sample Populations, 46 J.
FORENSIC Sci. 453, 455 (2001).
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are brothers is higher than if they shared more common alleles.21' There is
agreement among scientists that allele frequencies differ for different racial
or ethnic populations, and that frequency data would be less accurate
without such differentiation.212  Other biological factors affect the
probability calculation: common inheritance, likelihood that the parents
randomly share a particular allele, and commonness of the allele in the
population at large.213
Despite these hurdles (of which related studies and opinions could fill
several volumes), the available research suggests that, from a statistical
standpoint, "the DNA of related individuals tends to be similar so as to
distinguish a relative out of the very large number of non-relatives in the
,,214DNA database. Although controversial, for reasons described below,
practical science demonstrates that familial DNA searches are significantly
accurate such that they could assist in criminal investigations.215 One study
estimates that familial searching could give a forty percent boost to the
number of investigative leads generated from a DNA database search.216
However, just because a technology is available, does not necessarily imply
that we should welcome it with open arms. In the discussion below, the
legal and ethical quagmires are explored and the article concludes with
policy recommendations regarding familial DNA investigations, but the
debate must move beyond the threshold inquiry of whether familial
searching should be employed. California and other states have already
answered that question in the affirmative. Instead, the debate must shift to
whether the increasing collection and use of genetic information as a result
of familial searches requires management and regulation.
III. SIBLING RIVALRY: PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
In the flurry to adopt sparkly new technology like the familial search, a
full exploration of its legality was neglected. Civil liberty advocates
quickly pounced on the opportunity to decry the amount of government
217intrusion. The fear is that the routine practice of the familial DNA
search and the corresponding investigations would subject "hundreds of
thousands of innocent people" to a lifetime of genetic surveillance by virtue
211. Chakraborty, supra note 210, at 455.
212. Wilson, 38 Cal. 4th 1237, 1247-48 (2006).
213. Murphy, supra note 121, at 738.
214. David Lazer, Searching the Family Tree for Suspects: Ethical and Implementa-
tion Issues in the Familial Searching of DNA Databases, TAUBMAN CENTER POLICY BRIEFS




217. McDonough, supra note 178.
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of blood-relation to individuals in the FBI database.218 Despite such fears,
the Fourth Amendment does not prevent familial DNA searches.
All fifty states and the federal government have enacted statutory DNA
database schemes and data bank acts that provide for the collection of DNA
samples from convicted offenders.219 In addition, federal law and some
states mandate DNA samples from arrestees.22 ° Since the 1990s, those who
have been required to submit samples have waged constitutional challenges
against the laws and met stiff resistance.221 While ethical questions present
murkier situations, the legal issues, by and large, concern privacy and
Fourth Amendment issues. These inquiries, as they relate to familial
searches, are not of the traditional ilk, which concerns an offender's interest
in his or her DNA (privacy) and the ability of the state to compel an
offender to submit a DNA sample (a seizure).222
Instead, the primary focus here is a two-fold inquiry: first, whether to
disclose to authorities the pivot identity when it is established that he or she
is not the source of the crime scene evidence; and second, whether
authorities can require a DNA sample from an individual whose forensic
profile is currently not in any database. That individual might be the
relative of an offender suspected of being the source of a crime scene
sample; or someone who has the misfortune of being related to a suspect
for whom no database contains the DNA profile (e.g., BTK's daughter).
For ease, such individuals will be referred to as a "target" (as distinguished
from a pivot or source) - a neutral classification for a person who does
not have a profile in the CODIS system and from whom the government
would seek a DNA sample.
Does a pivot have an expectation of privacy when he or she is not a
suspect in the crime? Can a target be compelled to give a DNA sample
when a relative's profile partially matches a crime scene sample? Both
cases lack legal definition and precedence. Thus, the first line of cases -
those related to the mandatory DNA collection provisions for offenders -
will be used to shed light on the subject.
218. McDonough, supra note 178.
219. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14131-34; see Robin Cheryl Miller, Validity, Construction, and
Operation of State DNA Database Statutes, 76 ALR 5th 239 (2000).
220. A related issue is whether or not to compel arrestees - individuals who have
yet to be convicted of a crime - to submit to a DNA test. In December 2009, the European
Court of Human Rights held that the UK could not retain the DNA of unconvicted persons.
The court ruled that the policy violated the express guarantees of European privacy. See
Rosen, supra note 142.
221. See, e.g., Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999); Schlicher v.(NFN) Pe-
ters, 103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 1996); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996); Rise
v. State of Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.1995); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.
1992).
222. Miller, supra note 219. (It should be noted that while it is convenient to consid-
er privacy and the Fourth Amendment separately, cases often straddle both issues with over-
lapping concerns.)
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A. SKELETONS IN THE CLOSET
Privacy is not something that I'm merely entitled to, it's an
absolute prerequisite. 223
Ask most Americans if privacy is a constitutional right, and they will
echo Marion Brando's position. Privacy, of course, is not an express right
in the United States Constitution, although the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments afford some modicum of privacy.224 In the context of DNA
collection and analysis, federal privacy inquiries generally fall under a
more traditional Fourth Amendment analysis. 225 This section, however,
considers privacy as an independent right, as is found in some state
constitutions.226
Privacy is an ever-evolving concept; the intrusiveness of the Internet
and media into our everyday lives demonstrates that the concept of privacy
has shifted over the decades.227 In the context of crime and punishment,
most people probably would advocate the use of DNA databases in
criminal investigations. After all, is not the intrusion minimal if it solves a
crime? Besides, the offenders in the databases lost the right to complain
when they committed the crime, right? But then ask those same people if
they would be willing to give their own DNA, and the question becomes a
more personal and intimate matter.
1. Constitutional Privacy Claims: The One-Size Fits All Database
Could a target maintain a privacy interest in her own DNA profile by
virtue of its similarity to a relative's profile in a database? Doubtful. A
striking majority of courts across the country have found that the collection
of DNA from offenders pursuant to a statute does not violate the right to
privacy of those persons. 8  In the eyes of the law, offenders in the
database have lowered expectations of privacy, and any intrusion into that
person's privacy is reasonable in order to maintain public safety.229 Public
safety and lowered privacy expectation rationales are the norm when courts
223. DAVID H. HOLTZMAN, PRIVACY LOST: How TECHNOLOGY iS ENDANGERING YOUR
PRIVACY 3 (2006) (quoting Marion Brando).
224. Cornell University Law School, Right of Privacy: An Overview, http://
topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
225. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 n.15 (9th Cir. 2004).
226. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. In addition to California, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, South Carolina, and Washington all have independent
fights of privacy in their state constitutions. National Conference of State Legislatures, Pri-
vacy Protections in State Constitutions, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid= 13467 (last
visited Jul. 31, 2009).
227. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) ("It would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy afforded to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.").
228. Miller, supra note 222.
229. In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile, Action Numbers JV-512600 and JV-
512797, 187 Ariz. 419, 423-25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
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deny claims that argue against the taking of offender's DNA samples.
Additionally, creative attacks on offender DNA collection laws fail to gain
relief.
In Alfaro v. Terhune,2 30 eight women on California's death row
challenged the California DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and
Data Bank Act of 1998 (the "California DNA Act"), which requires that
any convicted person "provide two specimens of blood, a saliva sample,
right thumbprints, and a full palm print impression of each hand for law
enforcement identification analysis., 231 In a unique argument, the women
claimed that the California DNA Act violated their privacy rights
(guaranteed by the California constitution) because one of the major
justifications for the policy - crime deterrence - did not apply to death
232row inmates. Not surprisingly, the court was less than enthusiastic about
the plaintiffs' contention. Although it recognized plaintiffs' constitutional
interests, the court rejected the claims, citing the litany of other states that
had upheld mandatory DNA collection from offenders.233 The court held
that offenders convicted of serious crimes have a diminished expectation of
privacy, the intrusions allowed by the California DNA Act were de
minimis, and collection of DNA from offenders serves compelling
234government interests.
The Alfaro court reasoned that the collection of DNA samples from
offenders serves the metaphoric greater good by avoiding wrongful
convictions and exonerating the innocent.235 As with other courts that
assessed DNA collection statutes, Alfaro found that the balance must be
struck in favor of the validity of such an Act and against the offender.236
Significantly, the plaintiffs raised the possibility that DNA testing would
reveal sensitive personal and biological information.237 Alfaro reached the
uniform conclusion that permeates privacy challenges to DNA collection:
While such policies are subject to constitutional analysis, the extent of
intrusion can be measured by the defined limitations on how the samples
and profiles will be used.238 The Alfaro court observed that no other court
has held that a government can extract and analyze a person's DNA for
unspecified purposes.2 39
This reference to specified purposes is critical. The legislatures of the
various states and federal government that enacted the DNA collection
230. 98 Cal. App. 4th 492 (Cal. App. 3d 2002).
231. CAL. PENAL CODE § § 295-99.7 (1999).
232. Alfaro, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 506.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 506-08.
235. Id. at 506.
236. Id.
237. Alfaro, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 507-08.
238. Id. at 508.
239. Id.
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statutes did not conceive of familial searches as a potential purpose and use
for the collection of the DNA samples. Arguably, an offender could mount
a challenge to the use of his or her genetic profile as a pivot to flush out the
real perpetrator of a crime - quite possibly a family member. This
approach, however, would ring hollow courting a judicial forum. In Alfaro,
the court anticipated such an argument (although not in the context of
familial searches). 240 The plaintiffs asserted that the California DNA Act's
prescription for the use of a DNA sample for "identification purposes"
could be broadly applied to "encompass almost any conceivable use of
DNA information., 241  The court disagreed and explained that the
California DNA Act did not permit the state to do "more than standard and
usual scientifically appropriate identification analyses with specimens,
samples, and print impressions. 242
Other creative efforts, such as an attempt to "backdoor" a privacy claim
by way of the Fifth Amendment, have likewise fallen on deaf ears. In
Trolinger v. Henry,243 an inmate challenged the requirement to submit a
DNA sample. In disposing of the petitioner's claim, the court noted that
the interest at issue was one of privacy in identification information.244 The
court determined that DNA "establishes only a record of the defendant's
identity-otherwise personal information in which the qualified offender can
claim no right of privacy once lawfully convicted of a qualifying offense"
and did not amount to a violation of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against self-incrimination.245
Indeed, courts are reluctant to find DNA collection from offenders to
be more than a trivial intrusion on privacy. Of course, the broad dicta in
any of these cases could easily apply to familial searches and nullify any
challenge to the scope of a DNA collection statute. Thus, such statutes are
one-size fits all, and likely permit the use of offender's DNA for a broad
array of forensic identification purposes, including familial searches.
Moreover, if offenders lose on claims over the use of their own DNA, then
the target likely cannot piggyback a privacy claim onto one that does not
exist.
2. Statutory Privacy Claims: Privacy for the People
As compulsory DNA collection became routine and privacy experts
fretted over the commercial use of DNA tests, states and the federal
government passed genetic privacy laws.246 For the most part, these laws
240. Alfaro, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 507-09.
241. Id. at 508.
242. Id.
243. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77341 (2007).
244. Id. at *3.
245. Id.
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-53; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70G(c) (West
2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.17020, 333.17520 (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. §
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prohibit genetic discrimination by health insurers and employers, meaning
that neither insurers nor employers can require a prospective insured or
employee to submit to DNA testing as a prerequisite to being insured or
employed. Of course, such laws include exceptions for law enforcement
purposes, along with provisions for paternity testing and fetal and newborn
screening.
Of course, in the context of familial searches none of the above laws
afford a target any privacy protection in his or her genetic material. The
privacy laws are narrowly tailored to apply in only a handful of settings -
24mostly, employment, health case, and insurance settings. 24 Consequently,
these so-called genetic privacy laws do not insulate targets from the reach
of law enforcement. Moreover, the legislative history of these statutes
makes clear that the intention was to protect individuals from genetic
discrimination in the insurance or employment context.248 Little, if any, of
the history focused on the use of genetic information in police
investigation. In short, a privacy claim is a weak avenue for a target to
exploit.
3. Can You Spare Some DNA?
The above analysis illustrates the implausibility of a colorable privacy
claim brought by a target in a familial DNA investigation. Indeed, the
concept of genetic privacy remains a distant apparition in most cases. The
same rings true when privacy rights are used as a gateway for a property
claim in DNA.
The right to privacy has its origins in property law, but the latter has
failed to add any credence to an individual's right to control the collection
and use of his or her genetic material. 249 The farcical case of Moore v.
Regents of the University of California ("Moore")250 emphasizes that point.
John Moore received treatment for hairy-cell leukemia at the University of
California, Los Angeles ("UCLA") Medical Center. 25 During the course
of treatment, Moore's spleen was removed and preserved by the medical
staff. Researchers at UCLA then used portions of Moore's spleen to
develop a revolutionary cell line from his lymphokines (substances secreted
71-551 (Supp. 2007). OREG. REV. STAT. §§ 192.53.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-53(a)(l) (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(1) (2008);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448.02 (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4301 (2009); GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-54-3(b) (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70G(c) (2003); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 333.17020, 333.17520 (2008); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-551 (2007); N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW §79-1(2)(a) (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-93-40 (2007); S.D. COD. LAWS §§
34-14-21-122 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9332(d) (2008).
248. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Genetic Privacy Laws, http://
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
249. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Un-
derstanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 737 (1997).
250. 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990).
251. Id. at 125.
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by cells of the immune system). Using Moore's lymphokines as a model,
the researchers were able to synthetically reproduce them for mass
production.252 UCLA obtained a patent on the cell line, listing Moore's
physician as the inventor.25 3 While the researchers and UCLA received
only an initial payment from a private-sector developer, no one, including
Moore's physician, ever informed him that his cells were used to generate
profitable medical technology.254
Moore eventually learned about the use of his cell lines and he sued
UCLA and his physician, alleging, inter alia, a violation of his property
rights in his genetic material.255 Moore bootstrapped his ownership
256argument to his right to privacy. 6 The California Supreme Court rejected
Moore's claims, and held that the genetic material could not be "unique" to
Moore.257 Because Moore's lymphokines have the same basic molecular
structure as any other person's lymphokines, Moore had neither a property
nor a privacy interest in his cells. 258
Standing alone, the Moore case is a bit of charade that avoids forcing
"round pegs of 'privacy' and 'dignity' into the square hole of
'property.' ' 259 While one's personal sensibilities may be disturbed by the
trade of genetic information on a biological commodity exchange, the court
failed to find offense. Moore unfortunately makes obvious that individuals
have no control over their genetic profile - and no property right or
privacy right can create that control. Similarly, in the confines of familial
DNA searches, there is no control over the use of the DNA profile.
As the foregoing demonstrates, the use of existing privacy
provisions found in constitutions, statutes, and common law is unlikely to
merit sympathy from a court. To reiterate, a privacy claim is a weak
avenue for a target to pursue.
B. SEARCHING FOR SCIONS
With independent privacy rights a blip on the radar screen, the next
level of inquiry examines the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis,
which also implicates privacy concerns. The Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides a right "of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. A Fourth Amendment challenge triggers two fundamental
questions: First, does the challenged action constitute a search or seizure by
252. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 126-27.
253. Id. at 127.
254. Id. at 127-28.
255. Id. at 128 n.4.
256. Id. at 137-38.
257. Id. at 139.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 140.
260. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 2.
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the government (federal, state, or local) that implicates the Fourth
Amendment? Second, if so, is the search or seizure "reasonable?"
261
A Fourth Amendment right depends on whether the claim challenges
the questioned conduct as a search or a seizure. The latter generally
involves interference with a property right (items seized by the
government) or restriction on movement (being arrested).262 On the other
hand, searches interfere with an individual's privacy interests. A Fourth
Amendment search occurs when government action interferes with an
individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy. 263 To have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the person must have both a subjective expectation
of privacy in the object of the search and that expectation must be one that
society recognizes as reasonable.264
Once the questioned conduct falls under the purview of the Fourth
Amendment, the government generally must have probable cause and
obtain a warrant in order to execute the search or seizure.265 In the normal
setting, the taking of blood or other bodily fluids gives rise to a prima facie
expectation of privacy, which is in contrast to other potential sources of
identification, such as being asked for one's name.266 Because of this,
offenders have challenged the relevant state or federal DNA collection
statutes. However, as with the independent right of privacy, no challenge
has been lodged against familial DNA searches. With no precedent for
guidance, the outcome of such a challenge perhaps can be predicted
through the eyes of current case law.
1. Name, Rank, and DNA
Although the collection of DNA falls within the confines of Fourth
Amendment protections, federal and state statutes authorizing the
collection of DNA samples from felons and arrestees have mostly
withstood a barrage of Fourth Amendment challenges because the statutes
fall under exceptions to the warrant requirement. Simply put, the state does
not need probable cause to compel DNA samples from convicted
offenders.267  Convicted offenders are deemed to have a reduced
expectation of privacy in their genetic information, whereas the general
public enjoys the full protections of the Fourth Amendment.268
261. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
262. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981).
263. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
264. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
265. Id.; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). However, exigent cir-
cumstances, among other exceptions, may relieve the government of both.
266. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). In dicta, the
Supreme Court has recognized that fingerprinting qualifies as a search. See Hayes v. Flori-
da, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985). But see 26 CARDozO L. REv 1867, 1889 n. 111 (collecting
cases); Dard v. Mississippi, 392 U.S. 721 (1969).
267. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839.
268. Id.
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Consequently, the mandatory collection of DNA from convicted offenders
(the state interest) outweighs the individuals' diminished expectation of
privacy.
No case has made its way to the Supreme Court, but the DNA Act and
its state law analogues have survived Fourth Amendment scrutiny in all the
circuits except the federal circuit (which has yet to encounter such a case).
From these cases, it is clear that courts continue to condone an ever-
widening list of circumstances where mandatory, non-consensual DNA
testing is permissible.
In the context of statutory DNA collection, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence takes one of two approaches, either a reasonableness/ totality
of the circumstances analysis or a special needs assessment. While the
Circuit Courts of Appeal are unanimous that DNA collection statutes pass
constitutional muster, they are split on which test to apply. The Second and
Seventh Circuits have applied a special needs analysis.269 In contrast, a
majority of the circuits - the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia - apply a reasonableness test
informed by the totality of the circumstances. 270  The Sixth Circuit has
applied both tests together. 271 Before a conclusion can be drawn about the
Fourth Amendment implications in familial DNA search, it is necessary to
examine the current state of the law as it applies in the most analogous
situation - DNA collection from offenders.
It is well settled that drawing blood constitutes a search, subject to the
Fourth Amendment.272 Because drawing blood is a physical intrusion, it
infringes upon the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 273 The related DNA test to obtain a genetic profile is an
additional invasion of that person's privacy rights.274 A somewhat less
intrusive method is to take a swab of the cheek, and that too constitutes a
search since it results in the development of a genetic profile, which is
private information belonging to a person.275
269. See United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006); Roe v. Marcotte, 193
F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999).
270. See United States v. Stewart, 532 F.3d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 2008); Banks v. United
States, 490 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924-25 (8th
Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Sczu-
belek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1280 (1 1th Cir.
2005); Kincade, supra note 267; Groceman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir.
2004); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
271. See United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 680-81 (6th Cir. 2006).
272. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (1989) ("A 'compelled intrusio[n] into the body
for blood' ... must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search.").
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005).
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As mentioned earlier, reasonableness is the cornerstone of the
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis.276  In determining the
constitutionality of a governmental search, the focus of the inquiry is on the
reasonableness of the search in light of all circumstances surrounding the
search in question.277 Usually, the search is evaluated by "balancing its
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.'278 In the standard setting,
the balance is struck by requiring a search warrant based on probable
cause. 27 9 Nonetheless, "neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed,
any measure of individualized suspicion is an indispensable component of
reasonableness in every circumstance.,
280
The Supreme Court has recognized a "special needs" exception to the
typical warrant and probable cause requirements, which dispenses with the
requirement of individualized suspicion in certain instances.281  "When
faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the
governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant
and probable-cause requirements in the particular context., 282 Under this
doctrine, suspicionless searches are carefully scrutinized and held
constitutional only when they serve a "valid special need divorced from
law enforcement objectives.' 283  So, in the context of DNA collection
statutes, courts express the view that DNA collection statutes are not
unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
For example, in Roe v. Marcotte,284 the court held that the Connecticut
statute requiring convicted sex offenders to submit a blood sample for
analysis and inclusion in the state's DNA data bank did not violate the
Fourth Amendment's mandate against unreasonable searches. The state
had a significant interest in special needs such as solving past and future
crimes and deterrence, which outweighed the offenders' minimal interest in
avoiding the intrusion of having a blood sample drawn.285 Ultimately, the
combination of studies submitted by the state that indicated a high rate of
recidivism among sexual offenders and the value of DNA evidence in
276. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
277. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989); Skin-
ner, 489 U.S. at 619 ("A showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor,
below which a search must be presumed unreasonable").
281. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) ("(W]e have permitted ex-
ceptions when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the war-
rant and probable-cause requirement impracticable').
282. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
283. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000) (stating that permit-
ting suspicionless searches to be justified by general interest in crime control would allow
such intrusions to become routine part of American life).
284. 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999).
285. Id. at 78.
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solving such crimes persuaded the court that the statute falls in the "special
needs" exception.
A less rigorous alternative approach to Fourth Amendment analysis
assesses the search in light of the "totality of the circumstances." It does
not require the state to identify a "special need." Instead, with respect to
DNA collection statutes, courts evaluate the totality of the circumstances
by balancing the degree to which the compulsion of DNA samples
interferes with the privacy interests of the offender against the significance
of public interests served by the compulsion.286
In Rise v. State of Oregon, the court took extra steps to distinguish the
privacy rights of prisoners from those of "free persons. 287 The court held
that the Oregon statute that required violent felons to submit a blood
sample for inclusion in the state DNA data bank did not constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.288 The
court balanced the public interest served by the creation of the DNA data
bank against the minimal intrusion on individual liberties created by the
compelled blood sample.289
Once again, the state produced highly persuasive evidence
demonstrating high rates of recidivism among the types of offenders
subject to the DNA statute, and the court took note that such offenses were
likely to yield DNA evidence that could assist in solving crimes.290 Thus,
the court concluded that the genetic profiles generated from the blood
samples would help identify perpetrators and solve future cases. 291 In
addition to it being a resource for future criminal investigations, the court
also explained that the DNA data bank would help prevent wrongful
convictions 292 - a justification that is apparently gaining some popularity
among the courts.
The court also viewed the DNA collection statute as being
"evenhanded[]," as it applied to all persons convicted of the predicate
offenses and therefore lacked arbitrariness in its mandatory function.293 In
total, all the factors reduced the offenders' expectations of privacy.294 The
blood samples' minimal intrusion into the offenders' privacy interests were
significantly subordinate to the public interest in preventing recidivism and
solving violent crimes.295
286. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118.
287. 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995)
288. Rise, 59 F.3d at 1560.
289. Id. at 1560-61.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1561-62.
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As both the Rise and Roe cases demonstrate, regardless of method, the
often one-sided teeter-totter between the state interest and the individual
interest frequently leads to the same result.296 Both approaches consider
the invasiveness of the procedure, the offender's reduced expectation of
privacy, the overriding interest in public safety, and the unique nature and
reliability of DNA as evidence of identity.297 These factors generally lead
to the foregone conclusion that DNA collection statutes are constitutional.
How does this frame the Fourth Amendment inquiry for familial DNA
searches? While the issue of familial DNA searches is unmarked territory,
there is reason to speculate that it too would pass Fourth Amendment
298scrutiny as applied to both the pivot and the target. In both cases, the
critical component considered is probable cause.
2. Pining for a Pivot
While it is unlikely that a pivot could challenge the generalized
database trawls used to isolate similar profiles, a Fourth Amendment
analysis seems appropriate where law enforcement requests the identity of
a pivot after a partial or familial match has been found. As its name
suggests, a familial search involves a search of the genetic identity and
profile of a pivot, but is this any different from the search of a license plate
or fingerprint database? Legally speaking, it is a tenuous argument to make
when examined through an objective lens that views DNA database
searches as nothing more than the combing through of available data. Even
though courts routinely find that offenders have minimal interest in their
genetic information after conviction, the situation here has nothing to do
with the reasons surrounding the offender's conviction. The disclosure of
the pivot person's identity to investigate a crime that he is innocent of
should require a showing of probable cause (or something close to it) such
that there is a likelihood that the pivot is related to the source.299 The
express guidelines of the few states that permit familial searching (or
partial matches) seem to satisfy the strictures of probable cause. For
example, in California, in addition to the source and pivot having at least
fifteen alleles in common, the following conditions must be met before the
name of the pivot will be released:
1) A written request sent to the Chief of the Bureau of Forensic
Services that describes the case, and attests that all other
296. Duncan Carlin, Less Privacy Please, We're British: Investigating Crime with
DNA in the U.K. and the U.S., 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 487, 498-99 (2008).
297. Id.
298. Scott Michels, Using a Relative's DNA to Catch Criminals, U.S. NEWS, Aug. 3,
2006, at 9, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060803/3data.htm.
299. Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that a search warrant
for DNA evidence lacked probable cause: Two anonymous tips and no corroboration does
not amount to probable cause).
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investigative leads have been exhausted, and a commitment to
further investigate the case if the name of an offender is eventually
released;
2) The crime scene profile is a single-source profile;
3) Y-STR typing of the same crime scene evidence that yielded the
submitted forensic unknown profile has been completed by the
submitting agency prior to the search 300 ;
4) The CODIS search must result in a manageable number of
candidates;
5) The candidate matches resulting from the modified CODIS
search will be prioritized by DOJ using appropriate statistical
calculations for relatedness;
6) Based on this prioritization, DOJ will conduct Y-STR analysis
of the offender sample(s);
7) If the Y-STR profiles of the evidence and offender sample(s) are
consistent, DOJ will review non-forensic information in order to
identify additional evidence bearing on relatedness, if available;
8) A DOJ committee will discuss the case with the local law
enforcement agency, the local laboratory, and the prosecutor's
office. After reviewing all of the available information, the
offender's name will be released unless there is a reason not to
release it; and
9) If the committee cannot reach consensus, the decision to release
the name to the investigating agency will be made by the Attorney
General or his designee.3 1
In effect, California has codified the probable cause guidelines that
would result in release of the pivot's name. Other states have guidelines as
to the required amount of common alleles, but have yet to clarify such
policies to the same extent as California. In Virginia, the partial match
needs to "be very, very close" before the identity will be released to
authorities.30 2 It remains to be seen what precisely constitutes "very, very
300. Y-STR, or Y Chromosome Short Tandem Repeats, are found only on the male-
specific, Y chromosome. The Y chromosome is inherited through the paternal line and re-
mains virtually unchanged through many generations. By examining specific locations on
the Y chromosome, a Y-STR profile can be generated for each male tested. Males who are
related through their fathers will tend to have the same or similar Y-STR profiles, and males
who are not related will likely have different Y-STR profiles. See DNA IDENTITY TESTING
CENTER, Y CHROMOSOME TEST (MALE SPECIFIC), http://www.800dnaexam.com/
chromosometest.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).
301. See Partial Match Memorandum, supra note 179, at 2.
302. Wah, supra note 148, at 928.
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close." On the other hand, Florida quantified its requirement of twenty-one
of twenty-six alleles in common between the source and the pivot before
the pivot's name is disclosed.3 °3 Florida claims to have solved at least eight
sexual assault cases using familial searching.
304
There is no uniform amount of common alleles that can be said to meet
what would be considered probable cause, as evidenced by Virginia's loose
terminology. Nonetheless, a court would likely find that Y-STR testing (in
the case of male source and pivot) coupled with a minimum agreement
between alleles would satisfy a probable cause requirement. Moreover, in
this case, it is not a question of probable cause that the pivot committed a
crime. Rather, the applicable definition of probable cause in this context is
"a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts are
probably true. 30 5 The facts at issue relate to kinship between source and
pivot. Nonetheless, courts have yet to hold that probable cause is even
required for release of the pivot's identity. But even under that strict
threshold, investigators can reach the pivot's name.
A pivot might also challenge being questioned by authorities once his
name has been disclosed, but courts are apt to dismiss such a claim.
Probable cause is not a relevant yardstick in this context. The Supreme
Court has ruled that questioning related to identity or a request for
identification by the police does not on its own constitute a Fourth
Amendment seizure such that probable cause would be required.30 6 In fact,
if a pivot so chooses, he or she can refuse to answer investigators'
questions.30 7 Only if the encounter with authorities rises to level where the
pivot believes that he may not voluntarily refuse or leave, is the Fourth
Amendment activated.30 8 Without more, police may question a pivot about
his family members.
3. Bombarding the Bull's Eye
A murkier subject is whether or not a familial search could give rise to
probable cause such that the government could compel a DNA sample from
a target. Clearly, the law in this area is a complete vacuum. The case of
Kohler v. Englade30 9 is instructive, however. In 2001, a serial killer raped,
and killed women in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 3  The surrounding
investigation included an FBI profile of the suspect and a task force tip line
303. Wah, supra note 148, at 928.
304. Id.
305. J.G. HANDLER, BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 431 (1994).
306. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983).
307. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216-17 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
554 (1980)).
308. Id.
309. Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104 (5th Cir. 2006).
310. Id. at 1106.
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for the public to call.31' In addition to the profile, crime scene evidence
revealed the killer's shoe size and, more importantly, genetic profile. 3, 2
Based on calls received from the tip line, investigators contacted more than
six hundred men as possible suspects.313
Eventually, the task force received two separate anonymous tips
claiming that Shannon Kohler was the perpetrator.314 Kohler had a twenty-
year-old burglary conviction, and fit some of the attributes of the FBI
profile.31 5 Kohler fit the profile in that he was unemployed, had worked as
a welder, and had worked on the same street where a victim's cellular
phone was abandoned.316 At the investigators' request, Kohler initially
agreed to provide a DNA sample, but later reneged. 37 Kohler also had a
shoe size of thirteen, which was different from the suspected shoe size of
the killer - ten or eleven.318
After Kohler refused to voluntarily provide a saliva swab for his DNA,
police secured a warrant to compel a sample. 3 9 Because of the warrant,
Kohler submitted to an oral saliva swab, and within one day, the media
identified him as a suspect in the investigation.32 ° More than two months
later, Kohler learned from a local newspaper that authorities had cleared
him as a suspect because his DNA did not match the killer's. 3 21 Kohler
filed a Section 1983 action against the City of Baton Rouge and the officer
who obtained the warrant for violating his Fourth Amendment rights.322
Somewhat unpredictably, the Fifth Circuit agreed with Kohler, and
held that, "Probable cause exists when there are reasonably trustworthy
facts which, given the totality of the circumstances, are sufficient to lead a
prudent person to believe that the items sought constitute fruits,
instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime. 323  The court took particular
issue with the affidavit in support of the warrant that articulated the
following: (a) Kohler was one of fifteen men, out of six hundred who
refused to give a DNA sample; (b) the task force received two tips from
different people that Kohler was a possible suspect; (c) Kohler was a
convicted felon; (d) Kohler used to be a welder for a company with a shop
on Choctaw Drive; (e) a cell phone taken from one of the victims was
311. Kohler, 470 F.3d at 1106-07.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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found on Choctaw Drive; and (f) Kohler was currently unemployed.324 The
affidavit did not include, however, any reference to the FBI profile.325
In finding a lack of probable cause, the court first observed: "An
anonymous tip, standing alone, is rarely sufficient to provide probable
cause for a warrant. 3 26 Police, in this case, failed to corroborate the tips,
nor did they explain the relevance of Kohler's employment status in
relation to the murders.3 27 The court found the link between Kohler's prior
employment on the same road where the cell phone was found as tenuous
at best. Moreover, the twenty-year-old burglary conviction was hardly
relevant (or probative) in a case where the perpetrator is a serial murderer
and rapist. 328 Ultimately, the court concluded that on the whole, the
circumstances "failed to provide a nexus between Kohler's DNA and the
serial killings. 329
The Kohler opinion is instructive in the sense that in order to compel a
target to submit a DNA sample there needs to be a "nexus" between the
target and the source. There needs to be corroborating information beyond
the familial search. That in and of itself will be a challenge with familial
searches. Investigators should view the results of a familial search as an
important lead that requires more legwork. The danger is that police would
interpret a familial DNA hit as "Do Not Acquit." Meaning, they would
take a lackadaisical approach to the investigation, and assume that the
DNA will win the conviction on its own. Kohler makes clear that such
assumptions do not pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny - authorities are still
obligated to investigate the lead and generate corroborating evidence before
they seek a DNA sample.
Law enforcement aside, public (and juror) perception is often that the
presence of DNA at a crime scene is an indicator of guilt. DNA at a crime
scene, however, potentially answers only two questions: What is the
evidence? Who does the DNA belong to? DNA does not address when the
sample was deposited, why it was deposited, or how it was deposited. A
testable DNA sample could be left at a scene through normal, non-criminal
activity any time prior to the crime.
While the compulsion of DNA samples is the most radical outcome of
a familial search, the more likely (and milder) outcome is that a target
might be subjected to questioning by the police, as a means of
corroborating that the target is the source such that a DNA sample would
be warranted. In that instance, the analysis is the same as it is for the pivot.
Targets do not lose their Fourth Amendment protections by virtue of being
324. Kohler, 470 F.3d at 1108-11
325. Id.
326. Kohler, 470 F.3d at 1111.
327. Id. at 1110-12.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1111.
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related to a pivot.330 Just as with a pivot, a target has the absolute right to
refuse to speak with investigators. Routine questioning, without more,
does not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
3. Oops, You Dropped Your DNA
While much can be made of the state's ability to compel a target to
provide a DNA sample, there is nothing that prevents law enforcement
from obtaining biological material "left behind" by a target in the course of
a day. The BTK case highlights this. Dennis Rader's daughter visited a
doctor on her college campus for a routine Pap smear. Unbeknownst to the
daughter, investigators could seize DNA from the tissue sample obtained
during the exam.3 3' They did not need her permission (although the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act requires a court order before law
enforcement may access a student's health data).332 Even the more
mundane activities - drinking a soda, chewing gum, throwing away a
toothbrush - allow investigators to acquire DNA samples without
probable cause.
The simple truth is that people leave microscopic deposits of DNA
everywhere.333 Because of the abundance and availability of this free
DNA, law enforcement is often permitted, without restriction, to obtain the
DNA left behind by a person they suspect of committing a crime.334 The
debate over the constitutionality of this practice is an altogether different
subject, but it bears mentioning since even if the police lack probable cause
that a target is indeed the source of a profile in the forensic index, there are
other means available to obtain that person's DNA.
To summarize the relevant privacy and Fourth Amendment questions,
the realistic outcome is that familial searching techniques, as applied to
both pivots and targets, will prevail. To be sure, familial searching and its
associated issues warrant at least a Fourth Amendment analysis in certain
respects. But, the ultimate result, given the overriding public interest in
crime prevention and resolution, will be to hold that such practices are
constitutionally valid.
IV. THE FAMILY TRUST: ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Often, the initial reaction to the implementation of intrusive measures
such as familial searches is to find legal barriers that will either diminish or
neutralize the threat. As discussed above, traditional legal limits lack the
330. Kincade, supra note 235, at 835.
331. Nakashima, supra note 8. An exception in the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act allows law enforcement to obtain a student's health data with a court order. Id.
HIPAA contains a similar exception for law enforcement purposes. Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R.§ 164.512(f) (2008).
332. Nakashima, supra note 8.
333. Joh, supra note 103, at 858.
334. Joh, supra note 103, at 858.
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stringency to make a demonstrable dent in the adoption of familial
searching policies. When the state of Maryland expressly rejected familial
searches, it was more so out of political pressure than constitutional
misgivings or scientific uncertainty. Familial searching is likely to be part
of the crime fighting tools of the future, and it probably is here to stay in
some form or another. The challenge thus becomes one of creating policies
that allow the technology to proceed, but at a measured pace and in a
principled manner. This section identifies and critiques some of the ethical
and political alarms that have been (or should be) raised, and, finally,
makes recommendations on the procedures and protections associated with
familial searches.
A. THE DNA OF DYSFUNCTION
The basis for familial searching is that related persons have related
DNA. It does not take a quixotic leap to see that we resemble our family
members in appearance, mannerisms, and personalities. These observable
marks of inheritance create assumptions about behaviors being shared
along genetic lines. Such assumptions have led some scholars to conclude
that familial searching will either contribute to or be the product of the
theory that criminality runs in families.335 According to the most ardent
supporters of familial searching, research suggests "there is a strong
tendency for criminal behavior to cluster in families. As a result, the near
relatives of those in DNA databases are at a relatively high risk to commit
crime." 336 Opponents of this reasoning fire back that criminality in families
is an environmental rather than genetic condition since "families tend to
live in the same area, and ... offenders tend to offend close to their homes
or in areas that they frequently visit.
337
It is questionable whether either view - criminality embedded in
genetics or in the external environment - justifies or derails the use of
familial searching. These models, however, are neither new nor unique.
From 1870 to 1920, the eugenics theory gained momentum in the United
States on the premise that "socially problematic behaviors are inherited and
can be reduced or eliminated by preventing the carriers of bad seeds from
reproducing. '" 338 The true disciples of this philosophy believed that social
ills were rooted in the family gene pool.339 Indeed, one theorist wrote that
"poor heredity and intemperance were so inexplicably mixed, so
interdependent that intemperance could lead to vice, crime, insanity, idiocy,
335. See Haimes, supra note 139, at 270.
336. Lazer, supra note 214; see also HUMAN GENETICS COMMISSION, MINUTES OF THE
HUMAN GENETICS COMMISSION PLENARY MEETING, ANNEX A: SUMMARY OF THE
PRESENTATION FROM DR. BOB BRAMLEY, CUSTODIAN, NATIONAL DNA DATABASE, Feb. 11,
2004, www.hgc.gov.uk (search "Open HGC Plenary Meeting").
337. Williams and Johnson, supra note 149, at 555.
338. NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, CREATING BORN CRIMINALS 2 (1997).
339. Id. at 34.
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pauperism ... handed down to children and children's children. 3 40 These
ideas eventually culminated in proliferation of sterilization programs.34!
The idea of filtering out the criminal "debris" continued as criminal
anthropology became a popular biological theory from 1890 to 1910.
Based on the premise that criminals physically embody their lot in life,
criminal anthropology posits that a person is "born criminal" and exhibits
ape-like, primitive characteristics visibly different from law-abiding
citizens.342 In other words, the "body must mirror moral capacity. 343
In some aspects, particularly punishment, eugenics and its sister
movement, criminal anthropology, converged in their objectives:
preventing criminals from breeding because they will only produce future
miscreants.344 The cadre of prophylactic methods included marriage
restrictions, forced sterilization, life sentences, and even death.345 By the
middle of twentieth century, the overt aim of weeding out the undesirables
from the gene pool met a legal roadblock. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the
Supreme Court ruled that compulsory sterilization could not be imposed as
punishment for a crime.346
While there is no evidence that familial DNA searching will open a
backdoor to a eugenics revival, the historic propensity to equate criminality
with family inheritance demonstrates a need to proceed with caution.347
This is especially true since at least one study may lend empirical support
to the "born criminal" attitude. A 1999 U.S. Department of Justice survey
found that forty-six percent of jail inmates had at least one close relative
who had been incarcerated.348 Whether or not criminality is attributed to
corrupt genes or an inescapable environment, there is a danger that the
increased use of family links to identify suspects might create a sort of
criminal cicatrix on the family. In the film Minority Report, DNA
predetermined a person's propensity to commit a crime, which marked that
individual for life.349 Similarly, the notion that crime breeds in families
puts a similar taint on persons related to a databased offender. Ultimately,
opponents fear that innocent family members will encounter a lifetime of
genetic surveillance.35° While this is perhaps the most radical (and
unlikely) consequence of familial search policies, it merits consideration in
340. RAFTER, SUpra note 338, at 34.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 110-12.
343. Id. at 110.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 112.
346. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
347. See TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS (1990).
348. Nakashima, supra note 8.
349. MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation 2002).
350. Rosen, supra note 142 (opining that familial searches were not intended by fra-
mers of the Constitution who were concerned about "corruption of blood," where family
members were financially punished for the crimes of their fathers).
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the larger policy questions about how much government intrusion into
personal lives people will permit.
Related to the concern of identifying and stalking genetic crime
families, is the fear that increased familial searching will disproportionately
identify and target minority groups, especially African Americans. 35  By
conservative estimates, African Americans represent only thirteen percent
of the U.S. population but constitute forty percent of the people convicted
352of felonies every year. As CODIS grows, so too does the number of
African-American profiles in the database. The proportional data indicates
that more African Americans will fall under scrutiny with the
implementation of familial DNA. One estimate holds that seventeen
percent of African-American citizens could be identified through familial
searches, while only four percent of the Caucasian population could be
reached.353
On the one hand, such numbers indicate that, in its most fierce form,
familial searching could make racial profiling tame and rather obsolete. On
the other hand, however, these are not astonishing statistics. The criminal
justice system itself reflects the same compositional bias. Because of this,
familial searching will follow the same disproportionate path. Racial
categories are already a factor in DNA profiling.354 Thus, it is doubtful that
familial searching will exacerbate an existing problem.
The impact that familial searching may have on the family unit cannot
be discounted, and must be considered on a case-by-case basis. It is
imperative that investigators take sensitive approaches when interacting
with those subject to familial searching - both pivots and targets. The
potential for disruption of family bonds - labeling crime families,
revelations about the existence or absence of biological relationships, the
anxiety over implicating unintentionally implicating family members in
criminal activity (by way of DNA) - is considerable. The approach here
must be careful and measured so as to avoid harm, especially harm that
could be prevented.
B. DEBUNKING THE JUNK
While the social ramifications of familial search policies cannot be
discounted, they are secondary to more pressing issues over the use and
potential abuse of genetic information. From testing forensic samples to
establish identity to using genetic tests to discover the potential for disease,
our genetic information is collected, tested, and retained for multiple
reasons. Ostensibly, forensic DNA profiling differs from other genetic
351. Rosen, supra note 142
352. Id.
353. Greely, supra note 22, at 259.
354. Rosen, supra note 142.
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tests in that it achieves identification by way of junk DNA.355 By contrast,
genetic testing is used to identify and isolate diagnostic information,
including past, present, and future medical history. The CODIS markers
are thought to hold no diagnostic information; their sole value lies in their
use as identification tools. A crime lab may know a person's name based
on her CODIS profile, but the lab will not know whether or not the person
carries the gene that causes breast cancer.
As technology advances, however, we learn more about our coding
DNA and the junk DNA. As it turns out, that "extra baggage" might
actually perform functions critical to the evolution of the human genome.356
Researchers now believe that the non-coding DNA markers (like the ones
that generate a forensic profile) have the potential to be significant even if
they are not within a specified gene-coding region.357 Some scholars
suggest that it would be disingenuous to characterize junk DNA as tiny
black holes in our genomic universe.358 Others dispel the intrigue and
innuendo, and describe the doomsday scenarios of abuse of CODIS
information as "science fiction. 359
While each claim has its merits, one conclusion is obvious: The pace of
advancement in DNA technology is taking it in directions that just a few
years ago were science fiction. When confronted with cases of identity and
age falsification by foreign recruiting prospects, Major League Baseball
began to require that these promising players (and their parents) submit to
genetic testing to verify age and identity.36 ° In August 2009, a Stanford
engineer announced that he invented a new technology for decoding DNA
that costs less than $50,000.361 According to the inventor, that low cost
"will democratize access to the fruits of the genome revolution" by
enabling hospitals and even small labs to decode whole human genomes.
362
Even the Federal Bureau of Investigation plans to take CODIS to the next
level by utilizing mitochrondrial DNA, Y-STR testing, and other "meta
355. See Bilz, supra note 91, at 859.
356. VIB (the Flanders Institute for Biotechnology), SCIENCE DAILY, Saved By Junk
DNA: Vital Role In The Evolution Of Human Genome, May 30, 2009,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/05/090528203730.htm.
357. Id.
358. Simon A. Cole, Is the 'Junk' Designation Bunk?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 54, 54 (2007), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
Colloquy/2007/23/LRCol12007n23Cole.pdf.
359. D. H. Kaye, Science Fiction and Shed DNA, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 62,
63 (2006).
360. Michael Schmidt & Alan Schwarz, Baseball's Use of DNA Raises Questions,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009, at Al, available at http://nytimes.com (search "Baseball's Use
of DNA Raises Questions").
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2009, at D3, available at http://www.nytimes.com (search "Cost of Decoding Genome is
Lowered").
362. Id.
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1
data" (including sex, last sighting, age, etc.) to help in the identification of
criminals and missing persons.363
So, the notion that junk DNA may hold diagnostic information or
evolutionary history is not a fairy tale. The question is whether the
government or some other private entity will exploit the budding
technology and its junk designation for nefarious purposes, such as
gathering genetic information to hold as a bargaining chip or, taken to its
extreme, framing an innocent person for a crime.3 6 In that vein, there are
federal and state laws in place that assess steep fines and/or criminal
penalties for the unauthorized access, use and abuse of genetic
information.365 In addition, the NDIS webpage, maintained by the FBI,
contains a Privacy Act Notice specifies that the DNA profiles in the system
are de-identified, meaning that personal identification information (such as
the name of the person the profile belongs to) are not in the system.366 The
point here is not to suggest that people are safe from a genetic incursion,
but to point out the mere existence of safeguards. Such safeguards,
however, require execution to be effective, and it remains to be seen if such
laws will in fact protect our genetic information.
C. MEET THE CREEPS
Lawmakers and law enforcement have identified the benefits of the
increasing use of DNA technology. In many ways, DNA evidence
represents the easy way to solve a case. Undoubtedly, there is the potential
to make quick and thorough offender identifications via the database and
remove the innocent from suspicion.367 In addition, the widely publicized
use of databases and familial searches might have the dual effect of both
deterring crime and boosting public confidence in the justice system. 368 All
in all, DNA databases and familial searching appear capable and
accomplished at executing their law enforcement purposes.
For all the advantages DNA databases provide in crime fighting, there
should be just as many concerns. As originally designed, NDIS and its
363. Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS - The Future, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/
lab/html/codis4.htm) (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).
364. Scientists in Israel recently published test results where they were able to fabri-
cate DNA evidence. Andrew Pollack, DNA Evidence Can Be Fabricated, Scientists, Show,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at D3, available at http://www.nytimes.com (search "DNA Evi-
dence Can Be Fabricated"). The scientists created unlimited amounts of "artificial" DNA
with a genetic profile to match anyone or no one. Id. One might imagine that artificial
DNA in the wrong hands may eventually find its way to crime scenes and evidence rooms.
While there is no current evidence of crime scene engineering, the technology appears to be
evolving faster than anticipated.
365. Natalie A. Bennett, A Privacy Review of DNA Databases, 4 uS: J. L. & POL'Y
FOR INFO. Soc'y 821, 835 (Winter 2008-09).
366. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Privacy Impact Assessment National DNA
Index System, Feb. 24, 2004, http://foia.fbi.gov/ndispia.htm.
367. Bennett, supra note 365, at 827.
368. Id.
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state counterparts (SDIS and LDIS) provide "an effective tool for solving
violent crimes." 369 This stated goal of solving violent crimes seems to have
morphed considerably with the ever-expanding nature of DNA collection
statutes, which now include arrestees, and offenders convicted of
nonviolent felonies and even misdemeanors in some jurisdictions.37 ° In
fact, the inclusion of arrestees in databases means that innocent citizens are,
in effect, treated just like the guilty, which erodes the concept of innocent
until proven guilty. Moreover, this contributes to the widely held notion
that if a person manages to get arrested, he or she must have done
something wrong.371 DNA databases create a new category of criminality:
"Innocentish," a purgatory of sorts where an individual's genetic profile
can be used against her and her family.372 The inclusion of arrestees or
misdemeanor offenders arguably deviates from the initial purpose of the
DNA database, at least the purpose that was sold to the public.
As the type of crime and the type of person included in a DNA
database continues to grow, the government is quick to identity the
statutory and regulatory firewalls that protect the CODIS profiles from
clandestine capture. The larger threat, however, may be an internal one. It
appears that the government may legally "license" such information in the
name of research. 42 U.S.C. § 14136b, entitled DNA Research and
Development, allows the Attorney General to issue grants for research and
development to "improve forensic DNA technology., 373 This research and
development may include "increasing identification accuracy and efficacy"
and evaluation of "increased collection and use of DNA evidence. 3 74 This
tiny addition in the larger DNA identification statutory framework could
open the door to research of genetic profiles, and represents a government-
endorsed intrusion into our genetic privacy.
As a consequence of all extracurricular activities sponsored by the
CODIS program and the federal government's DNA Initiative, CODIS and
its local and state progeny are proceeding down a path referred to as
"mission creep." 375  Mission creep involves the expansion of a project
376 SrAebeyond its original mission. Sir Alec Jeffries, the pioneer of DNA
369. CODIS Brochure, supra note 95.
370. Brian Doherty, Collecting DNA: Database Mission Creep, REASON MAGAZINE
ONLINE, June, 2006, http://www.reason.com/news/show/36657.htm.
371. Anne Martinez, Putting the Innocent Behind Bars, USA TODAY, May, 1995,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ml 272/isn2600_v 123/ai_16885413/.
372. Tom Sutcliff, Opinion, "Innocentish" - An Essential Part of Justice, THE
INDEPENDENT, May 12, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk (search "Innocentish and Sut-
cliff").
373. Justice For All Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14136b (2004).
374. Id.
375. DAILY MAIL, Alarm as Innocent People Fill DNA Database, Nov. 1, 2006, http:
//www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-413890/Alarm-innocent-people-DNA-database.html
[hereinafter "Alarm"].
376. Sheila Jasonoff, Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the Legal Process, 34
[Vol. 21:1
fingerprinting has misgivings about the fundamental change in the purpose
of DNA databases: "When the database was initially established it was to
database criminals so that if they re-offended they could be picked up.
There are now hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent people now
populating that database, people who have come to the police's attention as
a result of being charged with a crime but subsequently released. 377
Between research interests and the burgeoning database population,
familial DNA searches may become a secondary issue. Familial searches,
however, represent yet another extension of the initial purpose of DNA
databases. As Alec Jeffries noted, the databases (established with the
technology he invented) were meant to identify the perpetrator who left the
sample, not the family members of the perpetrator. If employed in a
slapdash manner, familial searches have the ability to further increase the
number of innocent people in the database.
As an illustration, imagine that investigators get a partial match to a
crime scene sample that indicates that an offender - the pivot - likely has
a brother who committed the crime. Further DNA testing reveals that the
two single-donor samples share a common Y-STR profile. Investigators
then discover that the pivot has five brothers. Even if only two of those
brothers are deemed worthy of further investigation because of geographic
proximity and other evidence, at least one, if not both, is innocent of the
crime but may nonetheless remain in the database if arrested and his
genetic profile and biological sample are added to the DNA hoard.
Indeed, the retention of profiles and samples as a result of the increased
familial searching policies is unsettling, even if the opposition to it lacks
definition. The vulnerability of genetic information from familial searches
or other database expansion activities merits careful scrutiny. The reason is
straightforward: To determine the necessary boundaries (if any) for the
collection and use of genetic information and the consequences related to
any breach of those boundaries. At the very least, uniform guidelines
would establish a base level from which to work. States store the majority
of tissue samples and generate the attendant profiles, but while some state
and federal regulations restrict access to and disclosure of information in
DNA databases these standards lack uniformity and clarity.378 Inconsistent
and vague provisions regarding the management of genetic information
may increase the likelihood that a government agency or commercial entity
will access such information for purposes unrelated to public safety and
law enforcement.379
Current federal and state practice requires criminal justice agencies to
retain and store the biological samples from which genetic profiles are
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 328, 337 (2006).
377. Alarm, supra note 375.
378. Bennett, supra note 365, at 830-3 1.
379. Id.
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generated. 380  Because of this, samples may be held indefinitely. 381 This
seems a coherent approach in the offender context since the actual
biological sample may be needed later either to challenge or confirm a
profile match.382 In the context of arrestees or individuals ensnared by a
familial search, however, this approach lacks the same validity. First, the
DNA profile and sample should both be purged from the system once it is
determined that the individual is innocent of any crime. Second, while
forensic DNA profiles are based on the junk DNA extracted from a sample,
an entire genetic profile can also be gleaned from the sample - including
sensitive information. Third, because of the potential that laboratories may
glean additional genetic information from the biological samples, what
obligation, if any, lab does the laboratory owe if it learns sensitive
information about an individual (such as possessing a gene that has been
known to cause cancer)? Without a doubt, as long as biological samples
are stored in addition to the retention of the forensic DNA profile in the
database, there is an opportunity for unauthorized parties to access that
information for "malicious, retributive, or oppressive purposes.
3 83
Currently, there is no law requiring authorities to purge the biological
samples and related profiles from a database once that person is no longer
under suspicion.384 Indeed, when one voluntarily submits a DNA sample
during the course of an investigation resulting from a familial search (or
perhaps even providing a DNA sample when arrested), the retention of
both the biological sample itself and the DNA fingerprint once that person
is excluded as a suspect exceeds the scope of consent. 385  Moreover,
consent in the first instance is often compromised since targets may feel
pressured to surrender to a DNA test in order to prove his or her innocence.
Purging the records is the only appropriate remedy to restore a target's
autonomy and relieve the target of the anxiety of being placed under
genetic surveillance. There is international precedent for this practice. In
December 2008, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the UK to
purge the DNA records of hundreds of thousands of innocent people from
380. Bennett, supra note 365, at 830-31.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 831.
383. Id.
384. While much was made of the passage of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimi-
nation Act (GINA), Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008), it lacks bravado. GINA on-
ly prohibits genetic discrimination in the confines of employment or health insurance cover-
age. Id. It does not prohibit the government from using genetic information collected and
used in criminal investigations for purposes completely unrelated to the criminal justice sys-
tem (such as population migration or geographic distribution of diseases). See Id. The lack
of provisions expressly restricting the use of genetic information collected in the course of
government investigations leaves a gaping hole that could facilitate a "mission creep" of the
purpose of DNA databases that originally were maintained to assist law enforcement.
385. D.H. Kaye and Michael E. Smith, DNA Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and
the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 413, 430 (2003).
[Vol. 2 1:1
PROBABLE CAUSE FROM PROBABLE BONDS
its vast national database.386 The United States could take a cue and
perhaps avoid a prolonged battle over the retention of DNA records of
unconvicted persons.
Of course, the conversations about who is in and who is out of DNA
databases would be rendered moot if calls for a universal database
prevailed.387 Support for a universal system gained momentum with the
increasing volume of profiles in DNA databases. From public safety
benefits to equalizing the criminal justice process across the races, there are
some arguments to be made for the adoption of a population wide
database.388 As the debate on nationalized healthcare in the United States
continues, a universal database may well be a product of that package - at
least one country has attempted to centralize medical and genetic records.
In 1999, Iceland pioneered the creation of a national database - DeCode
- to maintain healthcare records and store genetic information.
389
While trumpeted as an effective and easy way to administer and track
health, social and other benefits, critics have raised serious concerns about
genetic privacy, ethical treatment, informed consent, and genetic
discrimination.390 DeCode was intended to give Iceland a global edge in
medical research because of its isolated gene pool (little has changed since
the days of Vikings). 391 At the same time, however, DeCode was the birth
child of a private, for-profit company that sought to create one of the most
powerful drug companies in the world.392 And the biggest firestorm has
spun around the Icelandic government's agreement with the purveyors of
DeCode.393 In effect, Iceland's "government gave a single company
monopoly control of the country's health records. 3 94 Since 2000, more
than 20,000 people have opted out of DeCode's plans over concerns of
genetic exploitation.395 In the years since its inception, some scientists
have called for an international scientific boycott of Iceland because of
misgivings over genetic privacy and profiteering.396 Iceland aimed to be a
petrie dish from which genetic opportunity could grow, but the rush to
386. Jill Lawless, Britain to Purge National DNA Database, S.F. CHRON., May 8,
2009, at A6, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2009/05/08/
MNNV 17GK2G.DTL.
387. Kaye and Smith, supra note 385, at 437-59.
388. Id.
389. Michael A. Fortune, PROMISING GENOMICS: ISCELAND AND DECODE GENETICS IN
A WORLD OF SPECULATION 132-35 (Press 2008).
390. Fortune, supra note 389, at 274.
391. Robin McKie, Icelandic DNA Project Hit by Privacy Storm, THE OBSERVER,






396. McKie, supra note 391.
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implement a one-size-fits-all database skipped an appraisal of the
drawbacks.
From a simplistic perspective, DNA represents just another marker
along the spectrum of identity components. At one end of the spectrum are
broad observable classifications of gender, race, height, and body type. As
identification techniques have progressed, the identifying attribute has
become increasingly personalized: photographs, fingerprints, dental
features, HLA tissue typing, and finally, DNA. Does the increasing
personal nature of identification amount to an increasing threat to privacy?
While the use of genetic technology to apprehend criminals and even to
advance health care prevention and treatment have gained credibility,
Iceland's project serves as an example of the need to engage in public
education and informed discussions since the level and amount of genetic
harvesting causes concern and misgivings, of which Iceland, again, serves
as the example.
In promoting its open government policy, the Obama administration
has promised to have frank and candid dialogue with American citizens.
Some honesty about the trajectory of genetic surveillance and data bank
prospects should be included in that conversation. From familial searches
to genetic diagnoses, there should be concern and questions about the
growth of the use of DNA. Many states have enacted protections against
genetic discrimination in health insurance, employment, or both. These
laws vary widely in scope and many are untested in court. State laws fail to
provide uniform, ground level protections in even employment and health
insurance on which Americans can rely.
398
D. FAMILY (GENE) THERAPY
To malign the mining of genetic information without suggesting an
alternative would be the same as complaining about the results of an
election after refusing to vote. Thus, this section completes the discussion
of familial DNA searches by crafting an approach to the administration of
such searches and managing the results. It is tempting to construct a
collective ethical scheme that addresses all forms of genetic information,
but that is not the import of this article. Moreover, ethical guidelines
cannot be shaped into a "one-size-fits-all" model across the universe of
genetics. Rather, each situation - familial searches, genome sequencing,
etc. - requires particularized and careful controls that foster the
397. The White House, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies: Transparency and Open Government, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press_
office/TransparencyandOpenGovemment/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
398. Genetic & Public Policy Center, U.S. Public Opinion on Uses of Genetic Infor-
mation and Genetic Discrimination, Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/
GINAPublic_Opinion GeneticInformationDiscrimination.pdf.
[Vol. 2 1:1
PROBABLE CAUSE FROM PROBABLE BONDS
development of scientific ingenuity and protect against the abuse of genetic
information.
Thus, in terms of familial searching, the following policies should be
implemented uniformly by jurisdictions that elect to perform such
investigations. Included in this regime are provisions for obtaining partial
matches, instructions with regard to DNA samples of targets, and
importantly, a reciprocal right of access to familial searches for defendants
asserting claims of actual innocence. These guidelines are necessary to
inform individuals about the scope of the use of their genetic information
by demanding clear definition from governmental authorities regarding
collection, consent, and management of genetic information. Moreover,
these guidelines discourage the reckless or madcap collection of DNA.
E. FAMILIAL DNA SEARCH PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE
RELEASE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION, COLLECTION OF
BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES; PROTECTION OF GENETIC
INFORMATION; RIGHT OF ACCESS IN CASES OF ACTUAL
INNOCENCE
Section 1: Procedures relating to familial search requests and release of offender
information
399
(a) Before a familial search of the database may be performed, the following
criteria must be met and certified written request to the supervisor of [the
state crime lab or other forensic entity]:
(1) The forensic profile (the "forensic profile") is a complete single-
source profile, with values present at all 13 CODIS loci;
(2) The forensic profile was searched against the offender database
for a perfect match, and returned no offender profile; and
(3) All other leads and attempts to identify the source have been
exhausted.
(b) The release of personal identifying information of any offender requires a
written request sent to the [data bank oversight panel], 400 which includes
all of the following:
399. The provisions related to the familial search requests and offender information
were drawn upon from the California partial DNA match protocol. Memorandum from
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Att'y Gen. of Cal. to All Cal. Law Enforcement Agencies and
District Att'ys Offices, DNA Partial Match (Crime Scene DNA Profile to Offender) Policy,
Apr. 25, 2008, available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms-attachments/press/pdfs/n1548_08-bfs-
01.pdf.
400. This provision contemplates the creation of an oversight panel that makes
ethical and legal determinations with regard to DNA databases. The panel would consist of
both scientists and legal experts who evaluate various procedures (such as familial DNA
searches) and issue opinions and ultimately have authority to approve such searches.
Practicality dictates that each state create its own oversight panel, but budget constraints
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(1) Copy of the certified letter requesting the familial search and
describing the details of the case;
(2) The moderate-stringency search results showing that one or more
offender profiles share at least 16 STR alleles with a different but
potentially related forensic profile;
(3) A kinship analysis of the forensic profile and offender profile;
(4) A comparison of the allele frequencies between the offender
profile and forensic profile;
(5) Calculation of the likelihood ratio demonstrating the likelihood
that the offender and source are related;
(6) Prioritization of offender profiles most likely related to the
forensic profile; and
(7) If the forensic profile and offender(s) profile(s) both exhibit a Y-
chromosome, Y-STR profiles that establish that the forensic and
offender profiles are consistent.
(c) The data bank oversight panel will discuss the case with local law
enforcement, forensic scientists familiar with the case, and any other
advisory entity deemed necessary to make a decision.
(d) If the data bank oversight panel cannot come to a decision, the [state]
Attorney General or an appropriate designee will determine the release of
the offender's name.
Section 2: Procedures Relating to the Collection of Biological Information from
Individuals Identified Through Familial Searches
40 1
(a) No DNA sample shall be obtained from any person in connection with the
results of a familial DNA search without probable cause, a court order, or
voluntary consent as described in subdivision (b) of this section;
(b) In the absence of probable cause, if any person is requested by a law
enforcement person, agency, or court to consent to the taking of a DNA
sample in connection with an investigation of a particular crime, such
consent shall be deemed voluntary only if:
(1) The sample is knowingly and voluntarily given in
connection with the investigation of a particular crime;
could curtail that option. In February 2009, the National Resesarch Council, as part of a
study sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences, released a scathing report on the
state of forensic science. The report called for the creation of a National Institute of
Forensic Science (NIFS). "Badly Fragmented" Forensic Science System Needs Overhaul;
Evidence to Support Reliability of Many Techniques Is Lacking, NAT'L ACADEMIES, Feb. 18,
2009, http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordlD= 12589.
Budget constraints, federal preemption, and efficacy issues aside, NIFS would be an ideal
institute to house a national database oversight panel. Especially since databases by and
large use the same software - CODIS.
401. Provisions related to collection of biological samples used a Nebraska statute as
a model. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4126 (2006).
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(2) The results of the familial search validate this person as a
person of interest in the particular crime;
(3) The person was informed both verbally and in writing of the
following:
(A) The purpose for which the sample will be used;
(B) The fact that the DNA sample may unintentionally
reveal incidental medical, diagnostic, or other
genetic information unknown to the person;
(C) The request may be refused and that such refusal
does not supply probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to believe that the person has committed
a crime;
(D) No threat, pressure, duress, or coercion of any kind
was employed, whether (i) direct or indirect, (ii)
express or implied, or (iii) physical or
psychological;
(4) The person signs the writing, which contains the foregoing
information.
(c) Any DNA sample obtained in violation of this section is not admissible in
any proceeding for any purpose whatsoever;
(d) A person shall be notified in writing by the law enforcement agency
immediately upon the determination that he or she has not been
implicated by his or her DNA sample in the commission of the particular
crime in connection with which the DNA sample was obtained;
(e) Law enforcement shall also immediately destroy the DNA sample, the
resulting profile, and all other identifying information related to that
person; and will notify that person in writing when such action has been
completed;
(f) Any other personal property of such person shall be delivered to the
person and within ten days after the notification required by subdivision
(d) of this section with a written explanation that the materials are being
turned over in compliance with this section;
(g) The law enforcement agency shall purge all records, including, but not
limited to, written, recorded, or electronic materials, and identifiable
information pertaining to the person specified in subdivisions (d), (e), and
(f) of this section;
(h) No records of this person shall be transferred, shared, or otherwise
provided to any national, state, county, or local law enforcement agency
unless such person has been implicated in the particular case by his or her
DNA sample;
(i) Any incidental diagnostic, medical, or other genetic findings from the
DNA test shall only be disclosed to the person after that his or her express
written consent to such disclosure.
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(j) Any aggrieved person may file an against any person, including any law
enforcement agency, to enjoin such person or law enforcement agency
from violating this section; and
(k) Any person aggrieved by a knowing violation of this section may bring an
action in district court for damages. A person found by the court to be
aggrieved by a violation of this section shall receive damages of not less
than one thousand dollars and may recover reasonable costs and
attorney's fees.
Section 3: Procedures Relating to the Right ofAccess to Familial DNA Searches
for Defendants with Claims ofActual Innocence 402
(a) Reciprocal right of access. A Defendant challenging a conviction with a
claim of actual innocence may make motion for a participating laboratory
to perform a familial search. Such motion must be made under oath and
include the following:
(1) A statement of the facts relied upon in support of the motion,
including a description of the case; the evidence presented in the
case; and why familial DNA searching would assist in post-
conviction process.
(2) A statement that the Defendant is innocent and a description of
how post conviction familial DNA searching is relevant and
necessary to his or her assertion of innocence;
(3) A statement as to why identity is an issue in the case;
(4) A statement of any other facts relevant to the motion; and
(5) A certification that a copy of the motion has been served on the
prosecuting authority.
(b) Should the court permit the familial DNA search, such search and any
related investigation shall be performed in accordance with section 1 and
2, above.
V. CONCLUSION
Each new extension of the CODIS system, and its research-driven
counterparts, brings us closer to a universal database. As technology
402. If familial searching is going to be used to locate the guilty, it should likewise
exonerate the innocent. Indeed, as courts weigh the legality of DNA databases, one of the
justifications is that databases have the power to exculpate and clear names. In North
Carolina, familial DNA testing exonerated Darryl Hunt twenty-three years after he was
convicted of murder. The crime scene profile was searched against the state database and
returned a near match. The subsequent investigation led to the older brother of the offender
who partially matched the crime scene evidence. As a result the real murderer, Willard
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continues to advance to include such practices as familial searching,
forensic DNA collection is destined to intensify and expand. While the
ability to sol1,, crime, convict the guilty, and even exonerate the innocent is
a commendable goal, the use of familial searches in criminal investigations
necessitates vigilant and uniform guidelines for ethical investigative
practice. As the lines between state and private access to DNA databases
blur and converge, the above scheme is an effort to suggest rigorous and
practical guidelines for investigators and researchers alike. Familial DNA
searching is a certainty that cannot be avoided, but perhaps carefully drawn
criteria for its application can stimulate further conversation and
meaningful change in our approach to the use bioinformation so as to avoid
abuse.
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